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Abstract 
Since January 25th revolution, Egypt has witnessed an uneasy process of political change, one 
of which was the significant change in June 30th revolution, when the Egyptian army removed 
the Islamist president Mohamed Morsi from power, disabled the constitution and drafted along 
with other political forces a road map for Egypt’s political future.  
 
A content analysis was conducted to explore how the Egyptian print media framed the different 
involved Egyptian political forces at the national scene before June 30th revolution. The thesis 
examined front pages’ coverage of four papers, El-Horeya Wel-Adala, “Freedom and Justice”, 
Youm7 “The Seventh day”, Al-Masry El Youm, “Egyptian today”, and Al-Ahram “The 
Pyramids” newspapers.  
 
The period of the study is the crucial six months before the June 30th revolution. One composite 
week of news coverage was randomly selected from the six months where every day of the 
week was represented.  
 
A total of 31 main political forces from both Islamist and Liberal political forces; including 
political parties, political movements, pressure groups and political figures, were represented 
in the analysis. 
 
Two research questions were answered and the answers gave important knowledge of how 
the liberal, Islamist, and government newspapers framed the political forces and described 
the political conflict ahead 30th of June revolution.
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I. INTROUDCTION 
The media has a fundamental role in shaping people’s perceptions toward the world, 
and especially toward the issues they don’t have a direct experience with, (Happer & Philo, 
2013) The media shaped the public perceptions toward the national and international crises, 
political situations, wars, conflicts and social matters; the messages conveyed by the 
different media which people get exposed to all the time are shaping the world in a distorted 
way. (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992) 
 
As an effect of the media’s influence, some researchers assumed that the audiences 
believe the world is similar to what they see in the news coverage and in what the media 
choose to place under the light; accordingly, people tend to build their political and social 
views and make their related decisions according to the messages they perceive from the 
different media channels and types. (Potter, 2011) 
 
The effect of media is not limited to constructing images for reality only, but rather 
extends to giving it a context and a meaning. (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992) 
Thus, creating and endorsing stereotypes serve as a tool for political conflicts, dismantle the 
positive image of political rivals or vice versa and frame the facts so they could serve the 
purpose and the interests which the media organization is affiliated with. (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007b; Entman, 2007) 
 
Framing among other tools like Agenda settings and priming are considered as “tools 
of power” that create biased images of the reality, giving power to certain political groups 
and telling the people what to think about. (Entman, 2007) 
 
Politics and media have a significant relation when it comes to the media effects 
approach; the political discourse presented and adopted by the media shapes the public 
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opinion toward the political matters, creates the desired political position, provide people 
with the necessary information to vote for a specific candidate/ party in the elections. (Louw, 
2005) or in one sentence, formulates a certain reality toward a political group.  
 
Political turbulences and transition in any country demand strong tools to handle the 
evolving political situation and substitute the old political thoughts and beliefs with the new 
ones. In Egypt, and after the January 25th revolution, the media played a very important role 
in shifting the public interest from the usual agenda in 2010 to a new one that could match 
with the immediate outcomes and aspirations of the people’s movement. The corruption 
cases, freedoms, Human rights, the pluralism of the political field, the state of law, writing 
a new constitution, conducting free elections and other political demands were raised and 
adopted by the Egyptians, discussed as daily issues in the media and reflected mostly by the 
independent press (ELZahed, 2012).  
 
As the independent media shifted their role and sided with the people’s demands, the 
media in Egypt gained new significance and more influence over the national political 
process. The political opponents and competitors used the media, which was funded and 
endorsed by different political forces, to mobilize the people and win their hearts and minds 
(ELZahed, 2012)  
 
Statement of the problem  
In the time of political turbulence, political communication is getting more important in 
terms of shaping the people’s perceptions toward a significant political situation, helping 
them to understand it, giving them more knowledge about the current situation and helping 
them to make their decisions toward any course of actions they might need to take. 
 
The study aims at exploring how the Egyptian press, affiliated by different political 
ideologies and different types of ownership, contributed to the political conflict in Egypt at 
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that time. By studying how the different political forces from both sides were portrayed and 
presented to the public, the research can provide a look on the level of professional coverage 
and on how media was used as a tool of political power and struggle. 
 
The study sampled four newspapers that represent the most dominant ideological 
political groups; one from the Islamist sphere, the partisan newspaper EL-Horeya Wel-Adala 
“Freedom and Justice”, a state-owned newspaper Al-Ahram “The Pyramids”, two from the 
liberal sphere Al-Masry El-Youm “Egyptian Today” and Youm7 “The Seventh Day”. 
 
The period of the study is 6 months ahead of June 30th revolution; those months were 
the most politically unstable, and were full of clashes and violent events.  
 
Significance of the Study 
The importance of this study is that it explores a critical period of time and highlights 
the media relation to the conflict between the liberal and Islamist political forces. This study 
is offering a look at how the Islamist, liberal and government newspapers framed each of the 
political groups and how they contributed directly to the heated conflict that started months 
before June 30th and ended by the fall of the first elected president in Egypt after January 
25th revolution.  
 
The majority of Islamist media outlets, which were working during the conflict, were 
closed and taken off air either by the government or by the outlets’ owners. Thus, this study 
is considered a rare content analysis of the Islamist newspaper El-Horeya Wel-Adala that no 
longer exists and that had a great influence at the time. It is important to study how the 
different affiliated newspapers put their own descriptions of the current events, and how they 
framed the other political opponents. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
1. Historical Look at the Egyptian Media 
It is important to highlight certain developments in the Egyptian media history that 
allowed political communication to become influential and contributed to the overall 
political changes that took place in Egypt since 2011. This will also contribute to the context 
of the study.  
 
The Egyptian media is one of the oldest media systems in the region and the most widely 
understood among other Arab nations. Nevertheless, this media was tightly controlled for a 
long time by political dictatorships that ruled the country for more than 60 years. Every 
regime that took over the power throughout the modern history of Egypt and after the July 
23rd military movement, widely referred to as a revolution, invested in the media and used it 
as a tool for political communication.  
 
As cited in Khamis, 2011 (Boyed, 1977) stated that the situation of the media during the 
time of the Egyptian Iconic President Gamal Abdel Nasser was fully controlled, president 
Nasser nationalized all the existing media at that time and used the radio extensively as a 
tool of political influence. (Khamis, 2011)  
 
The main task of the media that existed at his time was to inform people about the 
regime’s views and deliver their messages to the Egyptian and regional audiences. The State 
media expanded to include all six publishing houses: 1)Al-Ahram “The Pyramids”, 2)Rosa 
El-Youssef, 3)Al-Akhbar “The news”, 4)Dar Al-Hilal “The Crescent”, 5)Al-Akhbar “The 
news”, 6) Al-Tahrir “The Liberation”, 7) Al-Qaumiyaa Lil Tawziee “The National entity for 
distribution”; by law, the board of directors and the editorial boards of all these publishing 
houses were appointed by the government (El Issawi, 2014). 
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In 1960, The Egyptian National TV was established, and in 1970 the Radio and 
Television Union (ERTU) was founded as a governed body to control all the broadcast 
services in the country (El Issawi, 2014). 
 
During President Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat period, a new political approach started with 
a pluralistic political life after the establishment of several political parties; this slight 
political change allowed political parties to publish their own publications. Nonetheless, in-
depth, the situation of the media remained the same, which is under heavy control of the 
political regime. (Khamis, 2011) 
  
In general both Anwar El-Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser used the media to promote 
their policies and to control the public perceptions of the current situations at that time; The 
private ownership of media was forbidden by law and the consecutive governments were the 
only publishers and broadcasters (Harper , 2014). 
 
2. Media during Mubarak Time 
The major transformation in the Egyptian media scene was during the time of the former 
president Hosni Mubarak, who ruled the country for the longest period in modern Egyptian 
history and was ousted by the people in 2011 revolution. In his time, the media was granted 
a general shallow independency. (Khamis, 2011) 
 
Although the independent media was granted permission to exist and to present a 
different type of content to the local readers and audiences, the structure level of the media 
system itself and the freedom of expression stayed violated and controlled by smart and 
indirect practices, which appeared to be supporting the independency of the media while it 
actually put a lot of restrictions around its work. (Khamis, 2011) 
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        During Mubarak’s time, the High Press Council, which was established earlier in 1975 
and was headed by the Egyptian president himself, was the only responsible authority to 
grant publishing license to private newspapers (Rugh, 1987 as cited in (Youssef, 2012). 
 
With more than 550 publications in Egypt, the Egyptian media, which appeared to be 
independent and self-controlled, was under a tight surveillance from the government with 
indirect measures; some of these measures were the publishing license that was controlled 
by the High Press Council as stated above, the appointment of the editors in chief of the three 
national newspapers in the country that was decided by the president himself and restricted 
the individual ownership of any independent publication. With these measures among others, 
the government exercised a high level of control for years over the national press (Freedom 
House , 2010) (Napoli & Amin, 1997) that granted a calculated margin of freedoms and 
opposition. 
 
 The first independent TV channel, Dream TV, was established in 2001 as an 
entertainment channel by the business man Ahmed Bahgat, who was so close to Mubarak’s 
regime and was also the main backer and funder to Mubarak’s electoral campaign at one of 
his terms (El Issawi, 2014). Dream TV opened as an entertainment channel in the first place 
that achieved a lot of success at that time and opened the door for other channels to exist. 
 
 In 2004, Al-Masry El-Youm, the first independent newspaper, was published marking 
a changing point for breaking the monopoly of the state over the news. Later, Al-Shorouk 
newspaper was launched as a new edition presenting a new type of journalism to the 
Egyptian readers (El Issawi, 2014). In 2001, Nile Sat company was established to launch the 
first Egyptian satellite channels. Later, several private media outlets were launched and 
Egypt had, for the first time, independent newspapers, TV stations and radio stations. 
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Although Mubarak granted the establishments of the first independent satellite 
channels, the measures that were taken to guarantee the full control were also hidden and 
appeared to the public as regulating rules that help to organize the media landscape. While 
it appeared that the private and independent ownerships of the media outlets in Egypt boosted 
the freedom of speech and the role of the media in the local society, the situation was 
completely the opposite, as the Egyptian media was granted a margin of freedom that was, 
yes, unprecedented but still tightly controlled and manipulated by the government.  
 
 Despite the new press experience presented by the independent newspapers, the entities 
failed in establishing a clear understanding of the professional values and remained governed 
by the board of owners who were able to shift the newspapers’ interests and directions 
according to their rules (El Issawi, 2014).  
 
 When the 2011 protests sparked and led to the end of one of the oldest regimes in the 
Arab world, Hosni Mubarak, who ruled the country for almost 30 years (1981-2011), the 
media scene in Egypt started to change and to mobilize its efforts for new roles and grounds. 
 
3. Media and January 25th revolution 
   The youth revolution brought massive calls of change throughout the country that 
suffered from a long time of corruption, social injustice and controlled political life; it also 
drew massive needs and demands of pluralistic and independent media, enlarging the 
number of dedicated audiences and readers and putting huge responsibilities on the media 
professionals’ shoulders to serve the people’s interests and their right to know.  
  
   During the days of the protests, the state-owned media remained in a state of denial 
toward the protests’ movements and insisted on spreading inaccurate news and framed the 
protestors mainly as young fools tricked by foreign agendas. The National state-owned TV 
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avoided in the first three days of the revolution to broadcast any footage of the protestors 
from Tahrir Square (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). 
 
   The majority of the independent satellite television stations which were, and still, 
owned and controlled by businessmen who were closely tied to Mubarak’s regime tried to 
alienate their content from the protestors’ voices and chose to stand with the Egyptian 
president and his regime at that time. (Abdulla, 2014) 
 
    However, the success of the protesters movements during the 18 days caused a direct 
shift in the majority of the coverage presented by these independent outlets and other 
powerful media ones as well. Headlines that support the protesters and the movements found 
their ways quickly to the independent journalism and broadcast content to join the few 
independent media outlets that started to supported the revolutionaries. (Hamdy & Gomaa, 
2012) 
 
    As (Alexander & Aouragh, 2014) argued, these changes were a direct effect of a 
rebellion that took place by the journalists themselves and initiated an act of professional 
revolution at many media organizations. One example was Shahira Amin, one of the senior 
news anchors in Nile TV the only state owned news channel, who resigned during the 18 
days of the revolution after she was pressured to speak false news (Sakr, 2013). 
 
    As the revolution was progressing, the majority of people were dedicatedly following 
the media to get information about what is happening and to understand and assess the 
situation, especially during the days where social media and internet connections were cut 
down by the government; this was an opportunity for different media organizations to frame 
the revolution events and shape the Egyptian public opinion toward the protest movements. 
(Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). 
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    After the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian media was divided into three main categories 
according to the ownership and the funding. The first was the state-owned media, which is 
owned and controlled by the state and where the journalists and media professionals are 
considered by law governmental employees. The second type was the independent media, 
of which the majority was, and still is, owned by businessmen who were either too close to 
the Mubarak regime or actually part of it. The third category was the “Islamist” media, which 
were owned and controlled by the religious political forces that arose to take part in the 
political conflict. 
 
    By the first year of the revolution, a number of media outlets were added to the 
national Egyptian media and to the few independent media that worked before the toppling 
of Mubarak. In May 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood launched Misr 25 “Egypt 25” channel 
as their first public broadcaster; the channel attracted the former employees of Al-Jazeera 
channel and from the well known website at that time Islam online (Sakr, 2013).  
 
    The Muslim Brotherhood also published El-Horeya Wel-Adala “Freedom and Justice” 
newspaper which was owned and controlled by their political party “Freedom and Justice 
party”. This newspaper was named after the MB’s political party and worked as the main 
propaganda tool for both the party and the MB itself. Other Islamists funded newspapers 
were launched like Al-Masreyoon “Egyptians”, Al Fattah , and Al-Nour “The Light” that 
was funded by Al-Nour Salafist party (El Issawi, 2014). 
 
    As on the liberal side and later at the same year, in August, two of the most liberal 
currently widely seen channels were launched by the Egyptian businessman Mohamed El-
Amin, launched CBC “Capital Broadcast Center” and Al-Nahar ”The morning” channels 
and Al-Watan “The Nation” the daily newspaper (Sakr, 2013).  
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    Media were used as a battlefield between different political forces in the country, using 
these mass communication tools to mobilize the public, win the street and stir a war of words 
and a counter war against political rivals. In the absence of regulations that work in favor of 
granting freedom of media practices, the media failed to launch what researchers called “its 
own revolution” where it remained captivated by the power struggle. The profound political 
conflict between both sides pro-Islamists and pro-Liberals put the media in the wheel of 
political struggle and used the new rise of freedom of speech to transfer one –sided views 
and rumors (El Issawi, 2014). 
 
    First presence of such conflict was directly after the 2011 revolution, as the pro-
Mubarak forces started to use social media effectively to re-mobilize people, especially after 
losing all control on the state media, while the independent media, owned and controlled by 
Mubarak’s men, started a unified campaign against the regime at that period. (Alexander & 
Aouragh, 2014) 
 
    The highest level of the direct and counter propaganda speeches was highlighted and 
concentrated during the one year of the ruling of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as 2012 
witnessed the expansion of the Islamists media and the counter liberal ones, creating a 
fragmented media scene and, as a result, a fragmented and divided society. 
 
    The two sides, namely, the Islamist and the liberal media, started a war of words and 
accusations. Using the media content of both channels with the obvious and announced 
political and ideological affiliations, they were targeting each other. The independent media 
formulated a one-line alliance against the Muslim Brotherhood, accusing them of trying to 
monopolize the power and exclude the non-Islamist political forces from the political 
process. At the same time, Morsi himself was leading the attack on the independent media 
describing it as pro-Mubarak media, while some of the Islamist’s media went far in their 
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attack by describing the opponents of the president as non-religious or infidels (Dib & Sayed, 
2013). 
 
4. Egyptian Media during Mohamed Morsi 
    Although Mohamed Morsi ruled Egypt for only one year, this year was full of political 
unrest and violent clashed. The 2012 constitution, drafted primarily by the Islamic political 
forces, put major limitations on freedom of speech. The Constitution contained articles such 
as article 31 that forbade the insult of the individuals and article 44 that forbade the insults 
of the prophets (El Issawi, 2014). Both articles were criticized for being too general and open 
for different interpretations that can lead to freedom of expression restrains and threatening 
the independency of the media professionals. 
 
    On the other side, the attack on Egyptian journalists began after Morsi won the 
elections, as unprecedented numbers of legal complaints against journalists were being filed 
for insulting the president. During the first six months of his ruling, according to Media 
Watchdog organizations reports, more than 20 criminal court cases were filed against 
journalists for insulting Morsi. Anti-Muslims brotherhood rule journalists were attacked 
while covering protests and there was continuous crackdown on state media professionals 
who were known of being critical to Morsi’s rule and to the Muslim Brotherhood group as 
a whole. (El Issawi, 2014; Harper , 2014). 
 
    According to a report released by the Arab Network for Human Rights Information, 
24 legal complaints were filed against journalists and TV hosts for “insulting the president” 
during the first 200 days of Morsi’s rule, compared to 14 cases referred to Egyptian courts 
for the same charge throughout the past 115 years before the revolution  (Al-Alfi, 2013). 
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    The State owned media witnessed attempts of control from the Muslim Brotherhood 
ruling party first by appointing Salah Abdel Maksoud as the Minister of Information, who 
was working as the head of media office of the MB general guide media and had no sufficient 
professional experience to hold such an important role in a complicated country like Egypt.  
 
    The fight was shifting from the previously mentioned war between the independent 
media and the government to become between Islamist and liberal media. The liberal media 
was receiving continuous verbal attacks and accusations from pro-Islamists and from 
officials including Morsi Himself (El Issawi, 2014).  
 
    Later the regime also allowed protesters from the Salafists movement, a religiously 
strict Islamist group, and supporters of Abu Ismail, a leading Salafists figure and a main 
backer and ally of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, to besiege the Media City in 6th of 
October City, located- in Giza governorate- 20 km from Cairo, banning a number of media 
personnel from entering the city to perform their jobs and attacking liberal journalists and 
anchors who were against Morsi’s rule. (Harper , 2014).  
 
    On the other side, the liberal media against the Islamist government started a war of 
words; this battle was referred to by Magdy EL-Gallad, editor in chief of Al-Watan “The 
Nation” newspaper at that time, by saying “This is a battle we did not choose” (El Issawi, 
2014). 
 
    The conflict between both Islamist and liberal media could also be seen from a 
perspective of supporters and opposition media. As Mohamed Morsi, was the first Islamist 
to rule the country and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood group that established later 
their political arm Freedom and Justice party (FJP), they were keen to launch and publish 
their own media and let other Political Islamist forces, who were in alliance with them, to 
establish media outlets. These Islamist media were playing a similar role to the state media 
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during Mubarak’s era; defending the ruler and presenting his vision as the ultimate truth as 
well as, primarily, conveying the regime’s messages. On both sides, each of political forces 
camps casted their tool for a political and ideological war in which the media used as a 
battlefield. 
 
5. From January 25th to June 30th  
    In January 25th January the Egyptians youth led a massive protest movement against 
former president Mubarak’s regime, chanting with three main demands (Bread, Freedom, 
and Social justice). The clashes that took place between the protesters and the Egyptian 
police and the fall of several casualties from the protesters’ side made a major shift of the 
demands of the people who mobilized their effort to remove old Mubarak from power. 
 
    The Protesters’ demands evolved through the 18 days to insist on the toppling of Hosni 
Mubarak who ruled the country for more than three decades. Eighteen days of unprecedented 
persistence for demands and the street’s loud voice led the Egyptian oldest president to step 
down and hand over the power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). 
 
    The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) ruled the country for one year and a 
half full of political instability and severe continuous clashes in the streets between different 
groups of people. With two referendums and one-parliament elections, the country seemed 
to be undergoing the farthest polarized political and social scenes that had ever happened.  
 
    By June 2012, the country elected the first Islamist president in Egyptian history 
Mohamed Morsi by a massive support from the majority of the liberal and revolutionary 
forces and with promises from the elected president and his Islamist supporters of 
inclusiveness and founding a civil state.  
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    The Muslim Brotherhood monopoly of power and the excluding of liberal forces led 
to the scene of June 30th where millions of people from different backgrounds went to the 
streets, demanding Morsi to leave, chanting to the defense minister at that time Abdel Fattah 
El-Sisi to remove Morsi from power. On July 3rd Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, along with the 
political forces, toppled Morsi from power, disabled the constitution and supported the head 
of The Constitutional Court to become an interim president.  
 
6. Egyptian Political Forces 
    With the momentum given to the political life after the fall of Mubarak, different 
Islamist political forces have merged and gathered their own supporters winning elections 
and political campaigns, non-religious political parties have been empowered and more 
liberal independent political figures endorsed the political scene; hence, Egypt witnessed 
two years of political competition. There is a simple definition of the political forces term,  
 
“Parties, personalities, pressure groups that strongly influence the   
economic and political stability of a country through their actions and 
pronouncements” (Busniess Dictionary , 2015) 
 
          This study defines the political forces as “the active political parties, civil society 
groups, pressure groups and other forces that had political affiliations and goals after January 
25th revolution”. We can describe the main political forces identified by the study and who 
were active during the Morsi’s year of presidency by dividing them into main camps as 
following.  
A. Islamist political forces 
   The active Islamists political forces in Egypt varied very much in the way they were 
dealing or looking toward the political situation or the democratic process in Egypt. While 
the Muslim Brotherhood group was dedicated to run in all types of elections in the county 
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and continue to do so with their political party Freedom and Justice, other Islamists forces 
denounced the elections and all democratic processes, describing them as anti-Sharia 
“Islamic law” practices.  
 
    These forces and movements cannot be described as a homogenous group, they may 
agree on the greatest goal, but their means to reach the goal are different among each 
others and cannot be placed in one category (Saleh, 2014). 
 
1. Al-Ikhwan Al Muslimun: (Muslim Brotherhood Group/ 1928-2013) 
    The Muslim Brotherhood Group “Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun” is the largest and oldest 
Islamist group in Egypt (BBC, 2013). The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was established in 
1928 in Egypt by the hand of Hasan Al-Banna, an Islamic scholar and a schoolteacher 
(Zollner, 2009). 
 
    As described by a study made and published by their official website, the Muslim 
Brotherhood Group call was established for two main reasons. The first is to introduce the 
Islamic Sharia and make it the basic reference that controls all the civil affairs of both the 
state and society; and the second is the greatest goal which is unifying all the Islamic 
countries under the concept of Islamic Ummah, with special focus on the Arab countries, 
against the western imperialism (El-Hudaibi, 1997). 
 
    The movement played underground politics for almost 50 years and had wide 
experience in mobilizing votes from all over the country. After January 25th revolution, the 
MB, although they refused to support the civil protest since the beginning, seized the political 
image by establishing their political arm and competing on the majority in all elections.  
 
    After reaching the president office, the MB faced a year of accusations of monopoly 
of power and excluding all liberal and non-Islamist forces from the national call. Later, in 
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November 2012, the MB movement mobilized their men in front of the presidential palace 
and attacked the liberal forces’ sit-in there. The MB members were filmed torturing and 
physically attacking members from the protestors and seizing them right in the front of the 
presidential palace for hours. Attacks on Liberal figures and journalists also took place by 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the clashes ended up with the death of several citizens among 
them a well-known photojournalist, Al-Husseini Abu Deif who was assigned by his 
newspaper Al-Fagr “The Dawn” to cover the clashes (Diab, 2012) (Egypt Independent , 
2012) 
 
    The clashes continued to take place from time to time between the MB members and 
anti-Morsi protesters till June 30th. Days before June 30th, the MB held a conventional 
meeting to support the Syrian anti-government militants and opened the door for Egyptian 
youth to travel and contribute to what they called “Jihad” (SkyNews Arabia, 2013). President 
Morsi, and other Islamist figures, attended the convention, during which one Islamist scholar 
gave a speech in front of Morsi and called the anti-Morsi protestors infidels who should be 
crashed (AlArabiya Net, 2013). 
 
     The MB organized a sit-in in Rabaa al-Adawiya,  a square near Rabaa al-Adawiya 
mosque who was named after the 8th century Iraqi saint (Baroud, 2013) where hundreds of 
supporters from different Islamists movements participated before June 30th revolution and 
continued for almost one month and half after the removal of Morsi.  
 
     The sit-in, which witnessed daily hate speeches against non-Muslims and the 
Egyptian state and threats of terrorist attacks, was dispersed by the Egyptian police forces in 
a deadly clash where, according to the final report of the investigation committee, 607 of the 
protestors and around 8 police officers had lost their lives (Aly & Fakhry, 2014). 
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     The movement was declared as a terrorist organization in Egypt, in 25th December 
2013, after heavy attacks against the Egyptian state and its army and police forces. Although 
the movement keeps denying their relations to all the accusations, in a videotaped interview 
during Rabaa al-Adawiya Sit-in, a leading MB figure Mohamed El Beltagy and in 
responding to a question concerning the deadly attacks taking place in Sinai, an Egyptian 
peninsula located in the eastern side of the country, against the police and army forces, El-
Beltagy said “We do not control the ground there, but all these insurgencies and attacks will 
stop at the same moment president Morsi returns to the presidential palace” (Alarabiya.net, 
2013) 
 
    In May 2015, the movement adopted the Call of Egypt “Nedaa El Kenana” Kenana is 
referred to Egypt in the Islamic literature, where 40 Islamist scholars around the world signed 
a declaration to call for the direct fight against the Egyptian government, responding to what 
they described as coup d’état and military crimes; the declaration was received positively by 
the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Many MB members are facing imprisonment, long term 
court sentences or even death penalties for various accusations, including the former 
president Mohamed Morsi himself.  
 
2. El-Horeya Wel-Adala (Freedom and Justice Party –FJP/ 2011-2014) 
    The political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the party was established in 
6th of June 2011, months after the January 25th revolution. As stated by the political party 
principles declaration, the party considered the principles of Islamic Sharia as the main 
source of the state legislations, and although they acknowledge that non-Muslims can refer 
to their own religious rules concerning the family matters, they stated that non-Muslims must 
submit to the Islamic law in the public order and other “morality” cases.  
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    The party also speaks about the overall morality reform that the Egyptian society needs 
in general and the necessity of building the Egyptian citizen from different perspectives, 
among which the “Spiritual” part is an important side. The principles also referred to the 
“Shurra” as the way to achieve the nation’s goals and point out that their ultimate objective 
is the Islamic law or the aims of Sharia’a “Maqasid El Shariaa” (Freedom and Justice party 
, 2011). 
 
    The party competed in the parliamentary elections late 2011, the first to take place 
after the January 25th revolution, and won the majority of seats; furthermore, they contributed 
by two consecutive candidates in the presidential race and won the president office with a 
slight difference against the liberal candidate General Ahmed Shafiq. In addition, the party 
was very active in mobilizing Islamic forces to draft the 2012 constitution and ignored all 
the liberal concerns, criticism and withdrawals from the constitution committee from the 
liberal forces. 
 
    After June 30th revolution and the ousting of their head from the president office, the 
FJP refused to join the National dialogue led by the Egyptian army along with other political 
forces and continued to protest and organize sit-ins in many spots in Egypt. An Egyptian 
court at the end dissolved the party in August 2014 and seized all the party assets to the state 
(Noueided, 2014). 
 
3. Al-Dawa Al- Salafiya: (The Salafists Call. 2011-present)  
    The Salafists Call is the founder of Al-Nour Salafist party and a key player in the 
Egyptian political scene since 2011. The Salafist’s school of thinking developed throughout 
long years in the Arab region, and they attribute their understanding of Islam to the ancestors 
or the past leading Muslim figures and their schools of thinking; they call for a literal 
implementation of the Islamic sharia (El-Sherif, 2015). 
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    The Call, which was created among the current wave of el Sahwa el Islamiyya (Islamic 
Awakening), contradicts with other Islam interpretations among which is Al-Azhar, the main 
Islamic university and source of knowledge for millions of Muslims (El-Sherif, 2015). 
 
    The movement was legalized in April 2011, in the wake of the 25th of January 
revolution, and used their wide influence in the Egyptian mosques to build a strong position 
for the Salafists movement and parties in the Political scene. And, although their beliefs 
contradicts mainly with the idea of representative parliament and democratic process as it 
contradict with the rule of god, the Call established Al-Nour party that run for every 
parliamentary election since then (El-Sherif, 2015). 
 
    The Salafist Call was not in good alliance with the MB as they deeply contradict in 
their Islamic interpretations to what Sharia is, and also in their goals and aims. The Call 
promoted for June 30th extensively and backed up the army and its leader at that time the 
Defense Minister Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. 
 
4. Al-Nour Party: (The light party / 2011-present)  
    One of the political parties that was established after the January 25th revolution, the 
party was founded on May 12 in 2011 in addition to two other Salafists political parties that 
followed strict Islamic Sharia law and ideology; the party was founded by Al-Daw’aa Al 
Salafyia (The Salafist call) (Jadaliyya, 2011). 
 
    In the 2011 parliamentary elections, Al-Nour party won 29% of the parliament seats 
(Coleman, 2012) and was described as the black horse of the elections. The party was always 
alienated from the polarization conflict in the years after the revolution, and joined the 
political forces in June 30th that supported the army and approved the future political road 
map. 
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    In 2015, the party was described as the “Solo Political Islam survivor” as it remained 
the untouched Islamist party, since June 30th, which was able to engage in any public debate 
and running for the 2015 parliamentary elections (Tarek, 2015). 
 
 
5. Al-Wasat Party: (The Center Party /2011- current)  
    The party was founded in 1996 but failed to receive the legal license until one week 
after the ousting of Mubarak. The party was always portrayed as a moderate Islamist party, 
until their leaders supported and joined the MB sit-ins ahead of June 30th in Cairo and in the 
rest of the country.  
 
    The two well-known party leaders Abou Ela Mady and Essam Sultan were arrested in 
July 2013 and were accused of inciting violence (Al-Arabiya net, 2013). Although the party 
was not banned by any court rule like the FJP, Al-Wasat Party has not joined the 2015 
parliamentary elections even though its leaders were discharged from prison (Gadaliyya, 
2011). 
 
6. Masr Al- Qaweya: (Strong Egypt / 2012-present)  
    The party was established officially in November 2012 by the hand of the former MB 
resigned leading figure and former presidential candidate Abdel Moneim Aboul Foutouh (El 
Deragly, 2012). The party was not in a close alliance with the MB rule as it called for earlier 
presidential elections and joined June 30th massive protest. The party leader described the 
Islamists protests in Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square as provocative and president Morsi as a 
failed president and pointed out that Morsi is allowing other external forces to interfere in 
his work directly (ONTV, 2013). 
 
    On July 5th, two days after the ousting of president Morsi, the Interim president at that 
time Counselor Adly Mansour invited all the political forces for a meeting, including Strong 
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Egypt Party. The party leader attended the meeting and declared his full support to the 
transitional period in Egypt and supported Mohamed ElBaradei’s nomination for prime 
minister office (Badr Eldine, 2013). 
 
7. Al-Gamaa Al- Islamiyya: (The Islamic Group/ 1970-present)   
    Established in 1970 in the southern governorates of Egypt, this party had a radical 
ideology of change by force. What they believe in as “Jihad” was the chosen way of change 
for the Islamic Group until they re-structured it and made the famous revisit to all its religious 
beliefs and references toward violence.  
 
    In 1973, the group, in collaboration with Al-Jihad organization, killed the Egyptian 
president Anwar El Sadat, and responded to the killing of their head in 1983 by attacking 
Luxor governorate, occupying the police station, the city hall and other vital places; however, 
the Egyptian security forces succeed in defeating them, returning the city back, and arresting 
all the group leaders. Additionally, the group was responsible for the biggest attack on 
tourists in Luxor in 1997 that left 59 dead; later, denouncing the violence granted the group’s 
leaders release from the Egyptian prisons and to start a normal life (Aljazeera net, 2015, 
Fletcher, 2008). 
 
    Leading MB figures were in the past members in the group before leaving it to join 
the Muslim Brotherhood Group, among those was Abdel Moneim Aboul Foutouh, the 
current leader of Strong Egypt Party and the former presidential candidate, Abou Ela Mady, 
the current leader of Al-Wast Party, and others. In 2006, several Gamaa leaders announced 
they left the group and joined the terrorism group Al-Qaeda, including Ayman El-Zawhry 
and others (Aljazeera net, 2015). 
 
    After January 25th revolution, the group established their own political party El Benna 
Wel Tanmya “Construction and Development” and enrolled in the political process. The 
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group did not have a unified position toward the deposing of president Morsi as some of the 
well known leaders supported the revolution and the removal of the MB figure from power. 
  
8. Gabhet El Dameer (The Consciousness Front/ 2013- present but not active 
inside Egypt)   
    A political coalition that was formulated early February 2013, according to them their 
main goal is to stop the polarization in the society and support the president’s legitimacy 
(Gharib, 2013). Although the front was not declared as an Islamist movement, the majority 
of its members were from the MB (members) and their supporters and did not support the 
ousting of president Morsi later on, what portrayed the coalition as an Islamist one.  
 
9. Hazemoon movement (Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail Supporters/ 2012-2013)  
          The Movement’s name refers to Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, a leading Salafist 
figure in the Egyptian political scene between 2011 and 2013. The movement that started 
during the presidential elections in 2012 presented itself as “A peaceful youth movement 
whose mission is to protect the revolution from retrogression” (Maged, 2012).  
 
           At later stage of the 2012 presidential election, Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismael was 
disqualified from the race by the Supreme Elections Committee due to his mother dual 
nationalities (Kirkpatrick, 2012) (Maged, 2012). Later, the movement played a strong role 
in supporting the MB rule.  
 
           In March 2013, Hazemoon and their leader called for a protest in front of The Media 
City, the headquarters of TV stations broadcast centers. The protest that started to object to 
the bias coverage by the Egyptian TV stations of the Islamists, ended up by violent actions 
from the side of Hazemoon and other Islamists protesters against the journalists who were 
entering the city or even covering the protest (Aboulenien, 2013; Maged, 2012). 
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    The movement, out of accusations of violence and attacking Al-Wafd Party 
headquarters, had witnessed the arrest of several members before June 30th and the arrest of 
their leaders right after the ousting of president Morsi. Days after the June 30th revolution, 
Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail was arrested and accused of inciting violence (Ahram 
Online , 2013). 
 
10. Mohamed Morsi (The Egyptian President/ June 2012- June 2013) 
    The first elected Islamist president in Egyptian history, was born in 1951 in a delta 
governorate in Egypt called “Al-Sharqia”, he studied engineering in Cairo University and 
later in USA (BBC News , 2015). 
 
    Morsi was elected in 2000 as a parliament member and acted as the main spokesperson 
of the MB members inside it. He was appointed as the head of Freedom and justice party in 
2011. During the 2012 presidential elections, Morsi was declared as a substitute to Khairat 
El Shater, the leading MB figure who was discharged from the presidential race by the 
Egyptian authorities at the time (France24, 2012). Mohamed Morsi won the 2012 
presidential race against General Ahmed Shafiq with a 51.7% from the total votes.  
 
    In 2012, he appointed Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the SCAF member, as a defense minister, 
and in June 2013, El-Sisi removed him from power after three days of massive protests and 
civil clashes around the country.  
 
11. Mohamed Badie (Muslim Brotherhood Leader /  2010- Unknown)   
     Mohamed Badie Mohamed Sami was born in 1943 and joined the MB in his early 
life; he has a degree in veterinary medicine. In 1993 he became a member of the MB 
guidance bureau, the highest organizational level of the group, and in 2010 he was elected 
as the supreme guide “Morshed” to all MB members around the world. Badee was arrested 
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after days of the dispersal of Rabaa sit in and he was convicted with several sentences 
(Nafezat Masr , 2013). 
 
12. Khairat Al-Shater 
    Al-Shater is a multi-millionaire businessman and key Muslim Brotherhood leader who 
played a prominent role in the organization since Mubarak time. Al Shater was reported as 
being the second in line in the organizational chart of the MB organizations and their main 
financier (Feteha, 2012). Al-Shater was convicted in 2007 on charges of supplying Al-Azhar 
university’s students with arms and provide them military training, he stayed in prison till 
he was released in 2011 (Al Jazeera , 2012). 
 
    Al-Shater was the main choice of the MB group in the 2012 presidential election 
before being disqualified by the High Committee of Elections. Al-Shater was arrested on the 
day of Morsi’s removal.  
 
13. Mohamed Saad El-katatni (Head of The Egyptian parliament in 2012. And The 
head of the FJP from 2012-present)  
    Mohamed Saad El-Katatni was born in 1953 in Upper Egypt. El-Katatni is a leading 
figure in the MB organization, he joined the Group in 1981 and was elected as a member of 
the Guidance Bureau in 2008. (Tarek, 2012), he was elected among the MB bloc in the 
Egyptian parliament in 2005. After the January 25th revolution 2011, El-Katatni was 
appointed as the head of the Egyptian parliament in 2012 and as the chairman of the Freedom 
and Justice party at the same year (Ikhwan web, 2012). El-Katatni was arrested days after 
the June 30th revolution and accused of inciting violence among other accusations. (Ahram 
Online , 2013) 
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14. Hisham Qandil (Former Prime Minister/ from 2012- 20th June revolution) 
   Qandil was the former irrigation minister after January 2011 revolution and was 
appointed as Egypt’s prime minister in 2012, he was born in 1962 and received a degree in 
engineering in 1984 from Cairo university (Ahram online, 2012).  Qandil was arrested after 
the toppling of Morsi (Al-Arabiya News, 2013) and released a year after with no charges 
(Mada Masr, 2014). 
 
B. Liberal Political Forces 
 
1. Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar political party (Free Egyptians party/ 2011-present) 
    Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar is a liberal party that was established in 2011 by the business 
tycoon Naguib Sawiras. The party embraces the liberal principles of democracy and 
freedoms of speech (Almasreyeen Al Ahrar, 2014) 
 
   The party formulated a political coalition the “Egyptian bloc” in 2011-2012 
parliamentarian elections, with the Egyptian social democratic party and Al-Tagammu party, 
the coalition was announced to try to defend the secular state against the MB and their allies. 
The coalition won all together 34 seats, from which the party had a share of 15 seats (Abdel 
Ghany, 2012) 
 
2. Al-Wafd party (The Delegation party/ 1919-present) 
    Al-Wafd party is one of the oldest liberal parties in Egypt, it was founded 1919 by the 
historical political figure Saad Zaghloul. The party was dissolved after the 1952 military 
movement and was re-established in 1978 during Anwar El-Sadat time (Ahram Online and 
Jadaliyya, 2011) 
 
   The party competed in all the parliamentarian elections, and although the historical 
relations between both the party and the MB had a long and old history of political conflict, 
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the party started to be closer to the MB organizations in 2010 elections, and followed by a 
political coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the elections of 2011-2012 
(Jadaliyya, 2011). 
 
 
3. Al-Tagammu party (National Progressive Unionist Party, 1976-present) 
   A secular leftist political party that was established in 1976 during El-Sadat time, the 
party enrolled in all the parliamentary elections since its establishment. After January 25th 
the party stand as a strong opposition to the MB rule and to Mohamed Morsi and acted as a 
main pillar in June 30th revolution (AlJazeera , 2014). 
 
4. Al -Tahaluf El Shabi  El Ishtiraki (The Popular Socialist Alliance party/ 2011- 
present)  
   The party was established in the aftermath of the January 25th revolution from the 
resigned members from Al-Tagammu party. The party entered the collation of “Revolution 
continues” during 2011-2012 elections along with other Youth parties from the revolution 
camp (Aswatmasriya, 2011). 
 
5. Al-Masri Al-Democrati Alektemaii party (The Egyptian Social  Democratic 
party/ 2011- present) 
   The party was established in 2011 and embraced the demand of the revolution; the 
party enrolled in the 2011-2012 elections and won 19 seats months after the establishment. 
The party joined June 30th protests and enrolled in the 2015 parliamentarian elections.  
(Egypt Social democrat , 2016). 
 
6. Gabhet Al-Inqaz (The National Salvation front/ 2013) 
   The front was established as a reaction to the “constitutional declaration” issued by 
Morsi in November 2012, this declaration seized him more powers above any court in Egypt 
 34 
 
(Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2012). The main coalition from liberal and non-Islamists figures 
which was behind the boycotting of elections, and calling for street protests and early 
presidential elections during Morsi’s presidential year. The front had among its members the 
two leading figures Mohamed ElBaradei and Hamdeen Sabahi (The National Salvation 
Front, 2013). 
 
7. Tamarod movement (Revolt movement, April 2013-Unclear)  
    Tamarod was established as a rebellion movement against Mohamed Morsi’s rule, 
gathering signatures from Egyptians all over the country and calling for early presidential 
elections. Tamarod was founded in Late April 2013 by the hand of members of the former 
Kefaya (Enough) movement that used to be active during Mubarak time and pushed for 
democratic changes (2004-2005) (BBC, 2013). 
 
   In 29th of June 2013, one day before the massive revolution of June 30th, the campaign 
announced the gathering of 22 million signatures accompanied with national ID numbers to 
end Mohamed Morsi’s rule and to demand earlier presidential elections (Hassan, Aly, & 
Abdel Tawab, 2013). The campaign called Egyptian people to join June 30th protest against 
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood Group and was a main pillar of creating the scene of 
ousting Mohamed Morsi by the army in July 3rd 2013. 
 
   The campaign succeeded in creating strong presence in few months and managed to 
find new and creative ways to contain all the anger the Egyptians had against the current 
regime at that time, by relating the January 25th revolution’s demands with short term goals 
which were the toppling of the Islamist President Mohamed Morsi and calling for early 
presidential elections (Elyachar, 2014). 
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8. 6th of April movement (2008-present with illegal status)  
   The movement was established in 2008 in the wake of the massive strike of the workers 
of El Mahala governorate, located in the middle of the Nile Delta northern Cairo. The 
movement was one of different pillars who called for January 25th revolution. 6th of April 
movement gained great influence over the young generation in Egypt between 2011-2013 
and played a significant role in toppling Mohamed Morsi from power.  
 
9. Mohamed ElBaradei 
         The Former Egyptian diplomat and a Nobel Prize winner, He was appointed as the 
director general of the international atomic energy power from 1997 to 2009, Dr. ElBaradei 
returned to Egypt during Mubarak time and called for massive constitutional change and 
democratic transition of the power. At that time and In alliance with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, he managed to gather one million signatures from Egyptians to demand 
Mubarak to amend the constitution and allow pluralistic political life. He returned Egypt 
with the January 2011 revolution and declared himself ready to lead a transitional 
government after the removal of Mubarak.  
 
  ElBaradei was surrounded by hundreds of young protestors who looked at him as a 
national savior. In 2012 he launched the constitution party and in 2013 he joined June 30th 
collation to topple Morsi and was appointed as a vice president till he resigned after Rabaa 
dispersal.  
 
10. Hamdeen Sabahi 
  A leading political figure, a journalist, and the former chairman of “Al Karama” 
political party, he enrolled in the presidential election in 2012 and gained around 5 million 
votes. In November 2012 he joined the Salvation front along with Mohamed ElBaradei and 
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other figures. Sabahi joined and endorsed June 30th and supported the interim president 
Adely Mansour.  
 
11. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi 
  El –Sisi is the former Egyptian defense minister and the current president of Egypt. In 
2012 he was appointed as a defense minister, El-Sisi was merged as a popular figure when 
he removed Morsi from power after days of massive protest, dismantle the constitution and 
put a road map in alliances with all political parties. In 2014, El-Sisi was elected as president 
to Egypt. 
 
7. The political coalition of June 30th revolution  
  June 30th revolution and the aftermath of the removal of Morsi showed two main 
coalitions; first, a liberal coalition led by Gabhet Al-Inqaz “The National Salivation Front”  
Tamarod movement “Rebel”, and liberal parties.  And, second, an Islamist coalition led by 
the Muslim brotherhood and Hazemoon movement. However, June 30th as an revolution 
against president Morsi, and its demands of early elections were supported by Islamist forces 
as well, like Al-Nour party, branch from Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya, and others. 
 
Figure 1: Coalition of political forces during June 30th revolution 
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III. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
         Mass Communication theories are the main tools through which we can study the 
success of the message and the mean of the communication and understand the effects of the 
mass communication over people’s perceptions and attitude. (Severin & Tankard, 2001).  
 
1. Framing Theory  
         “A media culture has emerged in which images, sounds, and spectacles help produce 
the fabric of everyday life, dominating leisure time, shaping political views and social 
behavior and providing the material out of which people forge their very identities” (Kellner, 
1995). 
         Framing is primarily a process of selecting certain parts of the reality and deciding they 
are more significant in the media content to promote certain concepts and interpretations of 
the real world, this process can be done by relating these issues to cultural common symbols 
(Entman, 1993). Using frames in communication is referred to as a process of “organizing 
everyday reality” ( (Tuchman, 1978). 
 
         Framing theory refers to the norm that all issues could be perceived from different 
point of views, perspectives, and sides. It also refers to the method through which people 
will process the problem, choose to remember, and formulate their opinions toward an issue. 
In other wording, how people will choose to act toward the issue (Chong & Druckman, 
2007b; Entman, 1993).  
          Framing is used to give definition to the problem and its outline, which is responsible 
for creating the problem, making moral judgments and suggesting solutions (Entman, 1993). 
Frame was defined by Gamson and Modigliani (1987) as "a central organizing idea or story 
line that provides meaning" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987). 
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         The frame effect depends on the combination of different factors including how strong 
the used frame is and its repetitive pattern, the strength of other competitors’ frames and the 
individual motivation toward it. While under certain circumstances, the collective effect of 
a combination of frames may differ and be stronger from the total effects of individual 
frames.(Chong & Druckman, 2007a). 
2. Frame Building  
         Framing can be construed in both positive and negative terms. It can be viewed as a 
strategy to manipulate and deceive individuals, or it can refer more neutrally to a learning 
process in which people acquire common beliefs, as in the coordination of people around a 
social norm (Chong & Druckman, Framing Theory, 2007b). 
  
         Frames’ building does not consist with narrow definitions of categories and types of 
coverage; generic frames can be used as wide categories to define and understand the 
differences in news coverage (De Vreese, 2005). 
 
         According to Entman (1993) frames emerge in four main spots in the process of 
communication: 1) the set of beliefs of the communicators, 2) the message, 3) the receiver’s 
perceptions, and 4) the surrounding norms and cultures (Entman, 1993). 
 
         Communicators and media professionals usually decide consciously or unconsciously 
what to say to their audiences and what to omit. Their judgmental situation also comes from 
frames that organize their beliefs and their understanding of reality (Entman, 1993).  
 
         The communicators are influenced by the internal factors of the media outlets and how 
these influences affect the way of coverage (De Vreese, 2005). In other cases, the frames are 
identified and created by those in power and grasped by the media (Severin & Tankard, 
2001). 
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  Entman (1993) defined the four functions of the frames, first it defines the problem, 
diagnose causes, make moral judgment and suggest solutions. (Entman, 1993). The four 
mentioned functions are formulating a “Cultural logic” where each frame help to sustain the 
others (Entman, 2004).  
 
  The two main important frames functions are the one that offer definition of the 
problem and the one that suggested a solution, both functions can assess whether the media 
projecting the frame is supporting or opposing the public policy (Entman, 2004) 
 
3. Framing as a theory of media effects 
         Using framing in political communication is giving power to politicians, to certain 
ideas and to political affiliations. It plays a great role in the exertion of political power, and 
reflecting at the same time, and the frames that have consensus can dominate the media 
agenda and eliminate other frames from being sent to the receivers.  
 
         In any political or social debate each side advocate for their own definitions of the 
story, the side who wins is the side that makes the people believes their framing of the debate 
(Severin & Tankard, 2001). 
 
  Severin & Tankard (2001) argued that framing technique is a powerful tool of political 
communication, and is harder to be detected as the bias in news stories, the receivers of the 
media messages might be able to detect the bias in any sent messages but they can’t notice 
it if the information is packaged and presented in certain frames (Severin & Tankard, 2001).  
 
  The Iraqi war was an example to follow in the American media, as the media coverage 
at that time ignored completely the negotiations between both Iraq and Kuwait and spoke 
about two dominant frames, war and sanctions. (Entman, 1993) 
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 Entman (2004) Cascade model is a model attempts to describe the media effect of the 
framing process. The model suggests that the frames is originated from different sides, first 
from those in power, the media elite, and the public; but at the same time the public’s reaction 
to the presented frame feeds back to the media and to those in power (Entman, 2004) 
 
         The frame effect depends on the combination of different factors including how strong 
the used frame is and its repetitive pattern, the strength of other competitors’ frames, and the 
individual motivation toward it, and under certain circumstances, the collective effect of a 
combination of frames may differ from the sum of effects of individual frames (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007a) 
         People tend to formulate their opinions toward any issue or problem according to their 
set of beliefs which usually is stored in their minds, only certain beliefs become visible in a 
specific time. The framing process is more likely to work on different levels of beliefs, 
creating new beliefs toward an issue, make these beliefs present and accessible, and 
strengthen the existed beliefs while they evaluate the presented one (Chong & Druckman, 
Framing Theory, 2007b). 
         Sniderman & Theriault (2004) argue that usually people are exposed to more than one 
frame of the same issue and problem, this multi-frame exposure is called“Competitive 
frames”, by receiving the different frames and views people tend to choose the alternative 
that is matching more with their principles and beliefs (Chong & Druckman, Framing 
Theory, 2007b). 
 
         It is necessary to identify how the frame can be spotted in the examined media content, 
the words that mark a frame does exist in the media message (Chong & Druckman, Framing 
Theory, 2007b) 
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IV. Literature review 
1. Framing the political situation in Egypt 
  Before the January 25th revolution, there was a general political scene that can 
rationalize why the political situation came that far. A comparative content analysis was 
conducted to study the pre-January 25th media scene to examine the front-page coverage in 
three newspapers, Al-Ahram, the state owned newspaper; Al-Masry El-Youm, an 
independent daily newspaper and Al-Wafd, the partisan newspaper of Al-Wafd Political 
party (Elmasry, 2012) 
 
  The study found that the three newspapers had their own similarities and their 
differences; For instance, the three newspapers had been mentioning the government news 
continuously but in different percentage. While the state-owned newspaper Al-Ahram 
portrayed Mubarak and his news positively and focused on the governmental sources, they 
also omitted the news of oppositions along with all the news about instability and crimes in 
Egypt. (Elmasry, 2012) 
 
  Meanwhile, Al-Masry El-Youm and Al-Wafd newspapers were more balanced than 
Al-Ahram and they both showed the positive and negative news in a balanced way. In 
addition, both newspapers portrayed the opposition in their coverage, while Al-Wafd 
portrayed more the opinion of the party, Al-Masry El-Youm quoted normal citizens who 
have different opinions. (Elmasry, 2012). 
 
          (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012) conducted a content analysis to study how the Egyptian 
revolution in 2011 was framed in the different Egyptian media. The study looked into two 
main groups of media beside the social media; the first group included, as defined by the 
study, “Semi-Official” newspapers that are owned and controlled by the state, and the second 
group included the independent newspapers (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). 
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  The study looked into three categories of framing, the protestors’ image, the reason 
behind the revolution and the third one was the solution for the crisis. The Semi official 
newspapers, owned and controlled by the government, used the “Conflict” frame to 
humanize the government and the current regime’s image against the protestors’ portrayal 
as misguided and under foreign influences. They also used the “Economic consequences” of 
the protest by stressing the fact that economy is falling apart. (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012) 
 
  In contrast, the independent media used the “human interest” to shape the protests, and 
called those who lost their lives during the street conflicts with the police; martyrs.  Later, 
the Egyptian Independent media changed their political position gradually and the framing 
of events went differently, according to (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012); the independent 
Newspapers later used the “responsibility” frame where they blamed the government and 
held them accountable for the safety of the protestors, attacking the old regime corrupt 
businessman and pointing a finger toward the vicious state security and its performances 
(Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).  
 
  While the Semiofficial newspapers defined the revolution as a conspiracy, the 
independent newspapers described the protests as a revolution. As for the cause of the 
revolution the semiofficial newspapers stated that the main reason behind the protests was 
foreign influence; moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood and the other Salafist movements 
were often mentioned in conspiratorial terms, while the reason behind the revolution was 
injustice, poverty, oppression and dictatorship (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). 
 
  Another study was conducted to analyze the different frames used in covering the 
January 25th revolution, the study sampled Al-Ahram “Pyramids” paper, Al-Masry Al-Youm 
“Egyptian Today” paper. A content analysis was conducted to analyze news stories and 
features in both newspapers during the 18 days of the revolution. The study showed that the 
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coverage in both newspapers varied along the days of the actual protest movements and 
before the ousting of Mubarak, the president who ruled Egypt from 1981-2011. The study 
argued that there was a significant role of the ownership of both newspapers in framing the 
revolution (Ibrahim E. , 2012). 
 
  Sara El Kamel (2013) used quantitative content analysis along with framing theory to 
conduct a comparative study between five newspapers in Egypt to identify the dominant 
used frames in their coverage. The study examined the coverage of Al-Ahram, Al-Wafd, and 
FJP, Al-Masry El Youm and Al-Shorouk. (ElKamel, 2013) 
 
  The study found out that the five newspapers did not agree on same definition of 
current political situation. Morsi’s news was the primary topic on the front page of FJP, 
while economy news was the primary topic on the front pages of Al-Ahram. The five 
newspapers reflected the political division in Egypt at that time, as both Al-Ahram and FJP 
provide news with positive impressions, the other three newspapers portrayed the country as 
being at risk (ElKamel, 2013) 
 
          In 2013 (Golan, 2013) examined how the European media through their op-eds looked 
at the Egyptian revolution of January 25th, how they framed it, and how they chose the 
sources and writers who contributed to explain the situation to the western readers. The study 
explored the identity of writers in both newspapers’ Op-Eds, choice of source and their 
selections of frames. (Golan, 2013) 
 
         The Study examined two main newspapers The International Herald Tribune, referred 
to as IHT, and the Wall Street Journal, Refers to as WSJ. By a content analysis to Op-Ed 
during and after the uprising, the analysis showed that both newspapers focused on the rooted 
cause of the uprising, the future potentials and threats and the Muslim Brotherhood as the 
common stated frames (Golan, 2013). 
 44 
 
 
          The study (Golan, 2013) found out that Op-Ed writers in both newspapers have also 
had their indications of the framing process, as IHT gave the majority of its Op-Eds to its 
writers, in addition to the American writers and Muslim Brotherhood, who contributed to 
the op-eds. WSJ gave more space to local writers and others from outside. IHT and WSJ 
both agreed to some extent on the first frame, as IHT focused extensively on the reasons 
behind the heated revolution and referred so much to the oppressive nature of Mubarak’s 
regime and how citizens lacked basic freedoms, the WSJ European Edition analysis stated 
that the lost sense of pride, with the absence of basic human rights and the lost hopes for the 
young people of Egypt were behind the uprising (Golan, 2013) While the IHT columnists 
carefully analyzed the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the upcoming future of Egypt and 
deeply undermined the threat that the MB might be causing.  
 
         The WSJ was totally on the opposite side as it raised a deep concern toward the role 
and intention of the Muslim Brotherhood and how Egypt will look like under a theocratic 
rule. Op-Ed writers in both newspapers have also their indications of the framing process, as 
IHT give the majority of its op-eds to its writers, WSJ gives more space to Egyptian writers 
and outside ones (Golan, 2013) 
 
  (Grimmrt, 2012) conducted a content analysis to explore the framing of the January 
25th revolution in the U.S. newspapers. The study sampled 153 stories from the following 
newspapers “The New York Times” and “The Washington Post” and examined how sources 
frames the revolutionary protests at that time, the Former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak 
and how these protests had affected both Egypt and the United States (Grimmrt, 2012). 
 
 The results showed that the views expressed by the U.S. official sources overwhelmed 
the coverage framing the conflict in an unbiased way, while the analysis revealed that there 
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was uncertainty from the U.S. foreign policy towards the conflict in Egypt and its solutions. 
(Grimmrt, 2012) 
 
 Along the same line, a content analysis was conducted to explore the differences in the 
news coverage of the January 25th revolution between both news channels Aljazeera “The 
Peninsula” channel, and the CNN channel (Yehia, 2011). The study used the framing theory 
as a framework to explore the coverage.  
 
         The results showed that there were similarities and differences in how January 25th 
revolution was framed in both media. Aljazeera covered the revolution from the point of 
view of the protesters and the opposition leaders, gave the revolution an Egyptian context 
rather than a part of the Arab Spring as a whole, the channel also referred to the fact that the 
success of the revolution means that Egypt is on the direct track for true democracy. On the 
contrary CNN covered the revolution from the perspective of the U.S. government, raising 
the question of how what is happening in Cairo will affect the United States interests in the 
region (Yehia, 2011) 
 
2. Framing June 30th revolution  
   To understand how the print media dealt with the significant political transition in 
Egypt in June 30th revolution. The study examined the news coverage of five daily Egyptian 
newspapers, the state owned Al-Ahram newspaper, the Freedom and justice party paper, Al-
Wafd party paper, and both the independent newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm, and Al-Dostor 
(El-Abbassy, 2014) 
 
   The study examined six-month after the June 30th revolution and its results showed that 
there is a correlation between the type of ownership of each of these newspapers and their 
level of balance in covering the current events at that time. Al-Ahram, state owned 
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newspaper worked as a mouthpiece for the government while the Freedom and justice “El-
Horeya Wel-Adala” newspaper played the opposite role as a mouthpiece for the Muslim 
Brotherhood group. (El-Abbassy, 2014) 
 
   Both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Dostor were likely to speak critically  of the MB, 
however, Al-Dostor newspaper and unlike Al-Masry El Youm did not side with the 
government of the Interim president Adly Mansour, while Al-Wafd had a biased coverage 
toward the revolution of June 30th and had the most critical coverage against the Muslim 
brotherhood (El-Abbassy, 2014). 
 
3. Framing the Egyptian political forces  
        El-Haddad (2013) conducted a content analysis to study how the Egyptian press framed 
the “Islamic movements” after two years from the January 25th revolution. The study 
sampled four Egyptian newspapers Al-Ahram “The Pyramids”, Al-Masry Al-Youm 
“Egyptian Today”, Al-Youm AL-Sabea’, or Youm7 “The Seventh Day”, and Al-Dostor 
“The Constitution” papers  (El-Haddad, 2013) 
 
         Five frames were identified to assess the coverage of the five newspapers of the 
Islamist movement in Egypt; “The politically organized” frame, the “polarization” frame, 
“anti-democracy” frame, “anti-revolution” frame and “Violence” frame. Although the five 
frames used to assess the coverage as a whole, significant differences were proved by the 
study in the way the Egyptian press is looking to the different Islamist groups (El-Haddad, 
2013) 
 
         The results showed the the Muslim Brotherhood Group and their political arm the 
Freedom and Justice Party were the highest mentioned Islamist group among the studied 
ones, However, it was noticed by the study that both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Youm7 were 
mentioning all the Islamists movements under one category which opened the door to bias 
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generalization. (El-Haddad, 2013) “Au Ismail” supporters’ movement was the most 
negatively framed in all newspaper, while the “Salafi call” and its political arm “Al-Nour’ 
party were most likely to be framed neutrally in the majority of the examined article (El-
Haddad, 2013) 
 
   Halawa (2013) Conducted a framing analysis to study the image of the former Egyptian 
President Mohamed Morsi in the US newspaper, the study sampled two daily American 
newspapers, the Washington Post and the New York Times. (Halawa, 2013) 
 
  The study examined the coverage of six events that took place during the first six 
months of Morsi’s rule to identified the employed frames. The results showed that during 
the six month the two newspapers, and despite being too critical to Morsi’s rule sometimes, 
always framed him as “Moderate Islamist leader” and never used other stereotypical words 
or frames (Halawa, 2013) 
 
4. Liberal and Islamist media  
   As for the liberal vs. Islamist media, (Evans & Kaynak, 2015) conducted qualitative 
and comparative study and examined the media framing in Religious- Secular conflicts in 
both Turkey and Israel. The study focused on the socio-political circumstances that affected 
the journalists’ performance, which, by default, had an impact on how the media works. The 
study shows the similarities between both political situations in the two countries as, despite 
the obvious differences, both countries have witnessed a major rise of religious political 
parties in spite of their secular dominant populations (Evans & Kaynak, 2015)  
 
   The Media in both countries catered for the conflict between secular and religious 
political forces; although till 1990 both countries had media under the full control of the 
governments, the print media have long presented their interests. The study tried to explore 
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the framing of events in both affiliated media and to what extent their ideological affiliations 
have affected their role as watchdogs’ media (Evans & Kaynak, 2015). 
 
   The study found that the secular mainstream media framed the religious political forces 
as a great danger for democracy, rather than being a result of the people’s free will. On the 
other side, the religious media framed the secular society as immoral and that the attempts 
by the secular forces of stopping the passing of conservative legislations are a big defeat for 
the democratic process in the country. (Evans & Kaynak, 2015)  
 
   As for the watchdog role, both secular and religious media used this role to attack their 
opponents, show only the justice of their sides and try to protect the society from what they 
portrayed as wrong practices that can harm the nation. These practices led to diminishing the 
watchdog mission and weakening the democratic process. Another outcome was the 
polarization of the society; as both media refrained from reflecting the pluralism of the 
society, they tended to endorse the voices that reflect the same point of views (Evans & 
Kaynak, 2015) 
 
  Ossman (2007) conducted a study to explore the role of the thematic channels coverage 
of the current political affaires and studied the used frames of the news coverage. In addition 
to the content analysis and to identify how effective were the usages of these frames, the 
study surveyed a sample of politicians, academics and media figures, the study asked the 
surveyed sample about the most important political issues from their perspectives (Ossman, 
2007). 
 
  The study showed that the most used frames were “Political crisis” followed by 
“conflict” frame and “competition” frame. At the same time both Nile News channels and 
Al-Arabiya channel, which were among the analyzed sample, showed that “conflict” frame 
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was the top used followed by “legal” frames, then “religious frames” and “Human interests” 
(Ossman, 2007). 
 
  To study the correlation between the frames used in the news coverage and the public 
awareness toward the handled news, a content analysis was conducted in 2006 to explore the 
relation between the frames used in the coverage of the American-Iraqi conflict in the 
Egyptian papers (state and independent) from 1990 till 2003 and the awareness level of the 
Egyptian public toward this conflict (Heidar, 2006). 
 
  The study sampled Al-Ahram “Pyramids” paper from the state side, and Al-Wafd “The 
Delegation” paper for the non state newspapers. While the study used non-probability 
sample in surveying the public from difference districts in Cairo. The study showed that 
there was a clear relation between the public opinion of the Egyptians toward the conflict 
and the frames used in its coverage (Heidar, 2006). 
 
  Ibrahim S. (2013) conducted a study to examine how the Muslim Brotherhood group 
(MB) and their political arm the Freedom and Justice Party used their own media as channel 
to represent their ideologies and principles. The study sampled the official newspaper of the 
MB and their political party FJP, El-Horeya Wel-Adala “Freedom and Justice” paper, 
Ikhwanonline Internet website, Misr 25 “Egypt 25” (Ibrahim S. , 2013). 
 
  The study showed that although the MB media did not focus on the religious issues as 
primary content, their media outlets worked as mouthpieces for the Brotherhood Group. 
Their media dedicated the majority of their content spaces and airing time to represent the 
news of the Muslim Brotherhood Group and their Political Party Freedom and Justice Party, 
while giving less space to discuss other news and opinions (Ibrahim S. , 2013). 
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V. METHEDOLOGY 
This study explored the front pages’ coverage of the four selected newspapers during the six 
months ahead of the June 30th revolution, by using a quantitative research to answer two 
research questions.   
1. Content Analysis – An Overview 
    Content analysis is a quantitative research methodology to study the content of 
different types of media, the popular method can be used to assess, evaluate, and quantify 
the media content, to describe the communication content, compare the media message with 
the reality and test hypotheses. It is also a main tool to identify and assess the media image/s 
of certain groups or minorities (Wimmer & Dominick , 2006). 
 
    Content analysis method allows researchers to examine a wide range of text, TV 
interviews, newspapers and other types of media content (Macnamara, 2005). 
 
2. Analysis procedures 
Defining the universe 
  
   The study examined four newspapers; the choice was made based on an obvious 
rationale. The chosen newspapers were 1) El-Horeya Wel-Adala “Freedom and Justice” is 
the official newspaper of the Freedom and justice party, the political arm of the Muslim 
Brotherhood group. 2) El-Youm7 “The Seventh Day” a daily independent and one of the 
highest circulated newspapers in Egypt 3) AL-Masry El-Youm “Egyptian Today” the first 
independent newspaper in Egypt with a liberal affiliation and also one of the highest 
circulated newspapers in Egypt, 4) Al-Ahram “The Pyramids” one of the oldest state-owned 
newspaper.  
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   The sampling duration was six months before the June 30th revolution and the removal 
of the former president Mohamed Morsi from power, from January 2013 to June 2013. A 
total of 262 articles were examined from the four newspapers.  
3. Sampling approach 
   The Content analysis method has a great challenge when it comes to defining the 
population and deciding on the size of the sample drawn out of it. The purpose and goal of 
the research decide the size of the sample that allows a generalization of the results on one 
side, and the presence of limitations of the availability of the required resources, on the other 
(Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993). 
 
   The sample for this quantitative study was confined to the front pages of the four 
newspapers; El-Horeya Wel-Adala “Freedom and Justice” newspaper, the mouthpiece of the 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and 
the only available Islamist newspaper at the time of the study; Al-Masry El Youm “Egyptian 
Today” newspaper, the first independent newspaper in Egypt, with the highest circulations 
among all the printed press; and Youm7 “The Seventh day”, a daily independent.  The 
duration of the study is the six months ahead of June 30th revolution with a total of 28 front 
pages of the four mentioned newspapers.  
 
   Due to the limited availability of El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper after it has been 
stopped by the Egyptian interim government in the wake of June 30th, the study will examine 
only 6 months before June 30th. Continuing discussion about the sampling, it is a constructed 
week. Previous research have shown that two constructed weeks are enough to examine the 
coverage of one year (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico , 2014) (Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993) and as this 
study examines only a period of six months, a one constructed week would be representative 
and give reliable results.  
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    One way of sampling a constructed week is to randomly choose days from the whole 
population where all days of the week are being represented in the sample. The sampled days 
were chosen to make sure each day of the week is represented, one Sunday, one Monday, 
one Tuesday, one Wednesday, one Thursday, one Friday and one Saturday (Riffe, Charles , 
& Lacy, 1993). The research period will start from 1st of January 2013 to 30th of June 2013 
with a total of 28 newspaper issues.  
 
    Riffe, Charles , & Lacy (1993) Conducted a study entitled “The Effectiveness of 
Random Consecutive Day and Constructed Week Sampling in Newspaper Content 
Analysis”, in this study he explored the effectiveness of several types of samples in order to 
perform a content analysis; the comparison was between Simple Random, Consecutive days 
and the constructed week samples (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico , 2014)  
 
   The study (Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993) examined all local news items in a Sunday 
newspaper during six-month (182 days) and a total of 2774 local news items. The researches 
composed sets of samples; each group was selected through a type of samples. The study 
showed that “A smaller sample stratified for day of week will give reliable results and will 
produce better estimates than purely random samples” (Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993) 
 
   Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, (1993) highlighted that the constructed week avoided a major 
error that is the oversampling of a specific day. In addition, the study stressed that two 
constructed weeks worth a year of newspaper issues (Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993) 
 
    Elmasry (2012) Confined a similar study like the current one. He conducted a content 
analysis to explore how the government and the political opposition were framed in three 
different types of print media in Egypt; The Official Al-Ahram, The Independent Al-Masry 
Al-Youm, and the Opposition Al-Wafd. The research analyzed a period of less than 6 months 
from July 19th 2008 till December 31, 2008 (Elmasry, 2012). 
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   This study used one constructed week and chose one sample for each day randomly. 
The study will examine the front pages of 7 issues of each newspaper, a total of 28 front 
pages from the four selected newspapers.   
Table 1: The randomly chosen dates of the composite week 
Month Selected samples 
January  Tuesday, 15th of January   
 
February  Saturday 16th of Feb  
 
March Wednesday 6th 
 
April Sunday 7th 
 
May Thursday 30th of May 
 
June Monday 10th 
Friday 28th  
 
4. Research questions 
There are two broad questions this study is trying to answer,  
RQ1: How were the political forces framed in El-Horeya Wel-Adala, Al-Masry Al-Youm, 
Youm7, and Al-Ahram newspapers’ front pages’ coverage? 
RQ2: Which political forces were used as sources of news in framing other political 
forces? 
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Coding  
         The unit of analysis was the news items, including headlines and side headlines, and 
the photos that work as news item independently. However, all the photos that were parts of 
other news items were excluded from the analysis.  
 
         Out of literature review, the study identified the frames that were used in the content 
analysis, (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012) identified four frames in their content analysis of the 
Egyptian media after the January 25th revolution, which were “conflict” frame, “responsibly” 
frame, the “economic Consequences” frame and “human interest” frame.  
 
         The study looked into five media frames “responsibility”, “human Interest”, “conflict”, 
“economic consequences” and “morality” as dependent variables, to test how the media used 
them to frame the political forces at that time.  
 
         The coding sheet had groups of identification information, name of the coder, Name 
and date of the coded newspaper and the News item ID. In the second category of the sheet, 
there is information about the news format type, where the coding category asked about 
whether the news item was main headline, headline for inside story, main piece of news, 
news, picture, or side headline. Another coding category asks about the news item primary 
topic, with options varying from political situation, economics and others.  
 
         Next category in the coding sheet was about the political forces mentioning in the news 
item, whether they exist or not; if yes, the coding process is to be completed, and if not, the 
coding process is to be stopped and counted as no mentioning of political forces. The sheet 
looked only in the pictures that were used as a news item by itself; the pictures, which were 
parts of other news items, were excluded. 
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         A total of 33 political forces were placed in the coding sheet distributed on three main 
categories 1) political parties, 2) political movements and pressure groups, 3) political 
figures, with three blank spaces for others, one for each category; a total of 9 Islamist parties 
and movements, 8 liberal ones, 6 Islamists figures and their supporters and 8 Liberals and 
their supporters.  
 
         The next question was a long table that includes all categories of political forces against 
the used frames; the frames were distributed in five independent cells. Followed by the last 
question about using political forces as a source of framing other forces, in this category the 
same distribution of political forces took place. 
 
Statistical tools 
         The statistical analysis used in this study followed the SPSS statistical program. The 
following statistical parameters were calculated as shown below (Wimmer and Dominick, 
2003). 
The Chi-Square (χ2) Test: 
         χ2 is used to test the homogeneity of distribution of any two variables.  We assume the 
null hypothesis that the 2 distributions are similar. χ2 will measure if the null hypothesis is 
true or false. 
         χ2 is calculated as the summation of the squares of the differences between expected 
and observed values as a ratio of the expected value, (Wimmer and Dominick, 2003). 
   
                            (Observed – expected)2 
  χ2 = Σ ------------------------------- 
                expected 
         The significance of the resulted value of χ2 is tested at 0.05 or 0.01 levels of probability. 
If the p value is < 0.05 or < 0.01, the χ2 is significant at the probability level and the 
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distributions of A & B are not the same. If p >0.05 or >0,01 , the distribution of A & B is the 
same in each group. 
 
Inter-coder Reliability 
         Two coders, the researcher and a graduate student in media who was trained with a 
codebook for three days by the researcher to code the articles. After coding the 262 articles, 
a percent of sample 26 articles was re-examined to test the interceder reliability.  
Inter-coder Reliability test 
          For Nominal data, reliability can be tested in terms of percentage of agreement as 
follows, Holsti (1969): 
                           2M 
Reliability =   ------------ 
                        N1 + N2 
         Where M is the number of coding decisions on which two coders agree, and N1 and 
N2 are the total number of coding decisions by the first and second coder, respectively. 
 
          A sample of 26 sheets (about 10% of the total number of sheets) was recorded by a 
second coder. There were 256 decisions were recorded, resulted in 230 right decisions. 
Therefore 
 
                         2 (230) 
 
Reliability =   ------------     =   89.84% 
 
                        256 + 256 
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VI. FINDINGS 
  This chapter will present the findings of the content analysis done to all the news items of 
the front pages of three different newspapers Al-Masry El Youm, Youm7, El-Horeya Wel-
Adala, and Al-Ahram. The purpose is the examining of how newspapers from different 
political affiliations and ownership have contributed to the political conflict that led to June 
30th revolution, by framing different political forces on their front pages. The used frames 
were “responsibility”, “conflict”, “Human Interest”, “Economic consequences” and 
“morality”.  
 
Format of News  
Most dominant news format for each newspaper 
     Each Newspaper was more likely to have a dominant news format in their front pages’ 
coverage, El-Horeya Wel-Adala is more likely to use main headline format in their front 
pages (32.20%, n=28), while Youm7 dominant news format is the headline of inside story 
(42.20%, n=27), Al-Masry Al-Youm dominant regular news format (54.40%, n=43) and Al-
Ahram dominant format was regular news format as well (63.40%, n=45). 
Less dominant news format for each newspaper 
     El-Horeya Wel-Adala is least likely to use the main piece of news format (3.40, n=3), 
while Youm7 is least likely to use side headline format (1.60%, n=1) of their total coverage, 
and Al-Masry Al-Youm is least likely to use the main headline formats in their front pages’ 
coverage (5.10%, n=4). 
 
Other news format 
         El-Horeya Wel-Adala used other formats of news with different percentage on their 
front pages, full text of news and side headlines were used with equal percentages for each 
one (28.70%, n=25), headline of inside stories format was used in the total examined articles 
(4.60%, n=4).  
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         Youm7 used the regular news format with relatively high percentage (39.10%, n=25), 
while used the format of main piece of news in (10.90%, n=7) and the format of main 
headline was a low percentage (6.20%, n=4), Al-Masry Al-Youm used headline of inside 
story format with a relatively high percentage (25.30%, n=20), while using the main piece 
of news (15,20, n=12) from the total front pages examined. The results showed that the paper 
did not use any side headline in their examined sample.  
 
         Al-Ahram used the headline of inside story format with a relatively high percentage 
(22.50%, n=16), while the main piece of news came in the second place (9.90%, n=7) on the 
paper front pages. Al-Ahram used both the main headline format (1.40%, n=1) and opinion 
format (2.80%, n=2) in a low percentage from the total coverage.  
 
         The results also showed that the format of using a picture alone as a news item without 
being included in any other format was only found in El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper 
(2.30%, n=2) and never showed in both Youm7 and Al-Masry Al-Youm. While Al-Ahram 
was the only newspaper that used the opinion format on its front pages.  
 
         A Chi square test showed that the difference across the four newspapers in distribution 
of format is highly significant = 151.129, (p=0.000).  
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Table 2: Format of News 
 Frequency (%) of newspaper name 
News Format El-Horeya 
Wel-Adala 
Youm7 Al-Masry 
Al- Youm 
Al-Ahram  Total 
Main Headline 28 
32.20% 
4 
6.20% 
4 
5.10% 
1 
1.40% 
37 
12.30% 
Main Piece of 
News 
3 
3.40% 
7 
10.90% 
12 
15.20% 
7 
9.90% 
29 
9.60% 
Regular Piece 
of News  
25 
28.70% 
25 
39.10% 
43 
54.40% 
45 
63.40% 
138 
45.80% 
Opinion 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
2.80% 
2 
0.70% 
Pictures 2 
2.30% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
0.70% 
Headline of 
Inside Story 
4 
4.60% 
27 
42.20% 
20 
25.30% 
16 
22.50% 
67 
22.30% 
Side Headline  25 
28.70% 
1 
1.60% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
26 
8.60% 
Total 87 
100% 
64 
100% 
79 
100% 
71 
100% 
301 
100% 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of News Format 
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News topic 
         The second tested variable was the topic of the examined news item. The findings 
showed that the primary topic of interests in the following three newspapers’ front pages El-
Horeya Wel-Adala, Youm7, and Al-Masry El-Youm was local politics, while the primary 
topic of interest in Al-Ahram newspaper was local economy. The politics news percentage 
reached (22.70%, n=57) from total examined news items from the four newspapers.  
     
          The highest percentage of news about the “local politics” found on Al-Masry Al-
Yom’s front pages (37.50%, n=20), while Youm7 has the second highest percentage 
(29.20%, n=19), El-Horeya Wel-Adala came in the third place with a slightly less percentage 
of politics news (20.90%, n=18) and Al-Ahram marked the last place with the least 
percentage of local politics news (15.70%, n=11).  
 
          Local economy news came in the first place as news topic in Al-Ahram coverage 
(27.10%, n=19), El-Horeya Wel-Adala came in the second place with a percentage of 
economic (18.60%, n=16), Youm7 had a less percentage (9.20%, n=6), and Al-Masry Al-
Youm came in the last place (5.10%, n=4). The percentage of the “Local Economy” news 
came marked a total of (15.00%, n=46) from the total front pages’ topics of news. 
 
         The regional issues marked in El-Horeya Wel-Adala (2.30%, n=2), Youm7 (1.50%, 
n=1), Al-Masry Al-Youm percentage was (2.50%, n=2), while Al-Ahram marked the highest 
percentage of covering the regional issues with (11.40%, n=8) from its total coverage.  
 
         The topic of security situation showed a low level of distribution in the three 
newspapers; for security issues El-Horeya Wel-Adala had (2.30%, n=2), Youm7 (3.10%, 
n=2), Al-Masry Al-Youm (1.30%, n=1), while Al-Ahram’s percentage was (4.30%, n=3).  
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          Chi square = 33.450 (p=0.001) highly significant indicating different distribution of 
primary topic in the four newspapers. 
Table 3: The primary topic of the news items 
  Frequency (%) of Newspapers  
Primary 
Topic of the 
news items 
EL-Horeya 
Wel-Adala 
Youm7 Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Al-Ahram Total  
Local 
politics  
18 
20.90% 
19 
29.20% 
20 
37.50% 
11 
15.70% 
68 
22.70% 
Local 
Economy 
16 
18.60% 
6 
9.20% 
4 
5.10% 
19 
27.10% 
45 
15% 
Security 
Situation 
2 
2.30% 
2 
3.10% 
1 
1.30% 
3 
4.30% 
8 
2.70% 
Regional 
Issues  
2 
2.30% 
1 
1.50% 
2 
2.50% 
8 
11.40% 
13 
4.30% 
Others 48 
55.80% 
37 
56.90% 
52 
65.80% 
29 
41.40% 
166 
55.30% 
Total  86 
100% 
65 
100% 
79 
100% 
70 
100% 
300 
100% 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Primary topic 
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Mentioning of political forces  
    This category was tested to identify the percentage of the news items that mentioned 
any political forces on the front pages of the four newspapers. The overall mentioning of 
the political forces reached (37.20 %, n=112) from the total examined articles.  
 
    Youm7 has the highest percentage of articles that mentioned the political forces in their 
front pages’ news items (52.30%, n=34), in the second place came Al-Masry Al-Youm with 
(49.40%, n=39) from the total coverage, El-Horeya Wel-Adala came in the third place with 
(25.58%, n=22), while Al-Ahram came in the last place with (23.90%, n=17).  
 
     A chi square = 21.665   (p=0.000) indicating highly significant differences of yes and 
no for the four newspapers. 
Table 4 : Distribution of political forces mentioning in the four newspapers 
 Frequency (%) of Newspapers  
Political 
Forces 
mentioned in 
News items  
El-Horeya 
Wel-Adala  
Youm7 Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Al-Ahram Total  
Yes  22 
25.58% 
34 
52.30% 
39 
49.40% 
17 
23.90% 
112 
37.20% 
No 64 
74.41% 
31 
47.70% 
40 
50.60% 
54 
76.10% 
189 
62.80% 
Total 86 
100% 
65 
100% 
79 
100% 
71 
100% 
301 
100% 
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Figure 4: distribution of the political forces mentioning in each newspaper 
 
Mentioning of political parties  
          The Freedom and Justice party (FJP) marked the highest place with highest percentage 
of mentioning among all the political parties; the percentage reach at Youm7 newspaper 
(30.00%, n-3); while the same political party had the highest percentage of mentioning in 
El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper (28.57%, n=4). 
 
         Al Masry El Youm had a very low mentioning of the FJP with (8.33%, n=1) of the 
total articles any mention the political parties, while Al-Ahram which came in the last place 
as the least newspaper to mention political forces in its coverage, had a similar number to 
Al-Masry El- Youm with (33.33%, n=1) from its total coverage.  
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Table 5: mentioning of the political parties in the four newspapers 
 Frequency (%) of Newspapers  
Political Parties  El-Horeya 
Wel-Adala 
Youm7 Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Al-
Ahram 
Total 
Freedom and 
Justice  
4 
28.57% 
3 
30.00% 
1 
8.33% 
1 
33.33% 
9 
23.07% 
Al-Nour 1 
7.14% 
3 
30.00% 
1 
8.33% 
0 
0% 
5 
12.82% 
Al-Wasat 3 
21.43% 
1 
10.00% 
1 
8.33% 
0 
0% 
5 
12.82% 
Al-Masreyeen 
Al-Ahrar 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
16.67% 
0 
0% 
2 
5.12% 
Al-Wafd  3 
21.43% 
1 
10.00% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
4 
10.25% 
Strong Egypt  1 
7.14% 
1 
10.00% 
1 
8.33% 
0 
0% 
3 
7.69% 
Others 2 
14.29% 
1 
10.00% 
5 
50.00% 
2 
66.67% 
11 
28.20% 
Total 14 
100% 
10 
100% 
12 
100% 
3 
100% 
39 
100% 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Political parties mentioning 
 
Mentioning of Political Movements and Pressure Groups in the Three Newspapers 
         Testing that variable showed that the Muslim Brotherhood had the highest mentioning 
percentage in the overall analyzed articles with (36.79%, n=39); the four newspapers 
counted the highest topics among other political movements and pressure groups.  
 
         Al-Masry Al-Youm mentioned the brotherhood with a percentage of (47.62%, n=20) 
from its total coverage, while El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspapers came in the second place 
(41.67%, n=5), in the third place came Youm7 newspapers with (30.95%, n=13), while Al-
Ahram marked the least percentage of mention the Group with (10.00%, n=1) from the total 
news items that mentioned the political forces in their front pages.  
 
          The Islamists movements and forces as general came in the second place in the overall 
political movements and pressure groups mentioning with an overall percentage of  (13.20%, 
n=14), were distributed as following El-Horeya Wel-Adala (8.33%, n=1) Youm7 (16.67%, 
n=7) from their total articles, while Al-Masry Al-Youm marked (7.14%,  n=3) and Al-Ahram 
with (20.00%, n=3).  
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          At the same time the mentioning of the Liberal forces were mentioned (12.26%, n=13) 
where El-Horeay Wel-Adala had never mentioned this category, while Youm7 marked 
(16.6&, n=7), Al-Masry Al-Youm (9.52%, n=4)) and Al-Ahram (20.00%, n=2) from the 
total news items that mentioned the political forces. Several other political forces were 
mentioned in relatively low percentages. Chi square test was not done, as due to the too 
many zeroes mentioning, the test will be biased.  
Table 6: Political Movements and Pressure Groups Mentioning in the four Newspapers 
 Frequency (%) of Newspapers  
Political Movements 
and Pressure Groups 
El-Horeya 
Wel-Adala 
Youm7 Al-Masy 
Al-Youm 
Al-
Ahram 
Total 
Gabhet Al-Inqaz 3 
25.00% 
3 
7.14% 
3 
7.14% 
1 
10.0% 
10 
9.43% 
MB Group 5 
41.67% 
13 
30.95% 
20 
47.62% 
1 
10.00% 
39 
36.79% 
Tamarod 1 
8.33% 
6 
14.29% 
5 
11.90% 
0 
0% 
12 
11.32% 
Gabhet El Dameer 0 
0% 
1 
2.38% 
2 
4.76% 
0 
0% 
3 
2.83% 
6th of April 1 
8.33% 
1 
2.38% 
1 
2.38% 
1 
10.00% 
4 
3.77% 
Al-Gamaa Al-
Islamiyya 
0 
0% 
1 
2.38% 
2 
4.76% 
1 
10.00% 
4 
3.77% 
Abu Ismaiel 
supporters  
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
2.38% 
0 
0% 
1 
0.94% 
The liberal forces  0 
0% 
7 
16.67% 
4 
9.52% 
2 
20.00% 
13 
12.26% 
The Islamists forces  1 
8.33% 
7 
16.67% 
3 
7.14% 
3 
30.00% 
14 
13.20% 
Others 1 
8.33% 
3 
7.14% 
1 
2.38% 
1 
10.00% 
6 
5.66% 
Total 12 
100% 
42 
100% 
42 
100% 
10 
100% 
106 
100% 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Political Movements and Pressure Groups mentioning 
Mentioning of the Political Figures  
         The former president Mohamed Morsi is the highest mentioned political figure with an 
overall percentage of (53 %, n=53) and in all four newspapers; El-Horeya Wel-Adala had 
the highest percentage of mentioning with (60.00%, n=9), followed by Al-Ahram (55.55%, 
n=10), Al Masry Al-Youm came in the third place (52,04%, n=22), while Youm7 was in the 
forth place (48.00%, n=12). 
 
         Hisham Qandil, the prime minister at that time, came in the second place by (9.76%, 
n=8) from the total coverage; El-Horeya Wel-Adala had the highest mentioning of Qandil 
with (20.00%, n=3), Al-Ahram (22.22%, n=4), while Youm7 came in the second place 
(12.00%, n=3), and Al Masry AL-Youm in the forth place with (4.76%, n=2).  
 
         In the Third place in the overall mentioning came Abdel Fatah El Sissi (8.54%, n=7); 
General Abdel Fatah El-Sissi at that time had no mentioning in El-Horeya Wel-Adala 
coverage, while Al-Masry Al-Youm mentioned him (11.90%, n=5) in the total examined 
articles, Youm7 came next with (8.00%, n=2) and Al-Ahram with (11.11%, n=2). Chi-
square will be biased due to the may zeroes in the findings and was not tested. 
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Table 7: Mentioning of the Political figures 
 Frequency (%) of Newspapers  
Political figures  El-Horeya 
Wel-Adala 
Youm7 Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Al-
Ahram 
Total 
Mohamed Morsi 9 
60.00% 
12 
48.00% 
22 
52.04% 
10 
55.55% 
53 
53% 
Mohamed Badie 0 
0% 
2 
8.00% 
1 
2.38% 
1 
5.55% 
4 
4% 
Mohamed ElBaradei 1 
6.67% 
0 
0% 
1 
2.38% 
0 
0% 
2 
2% 
Hamdeen Sabahi 0 
0% 
2 
8.00% 
3 
7.14% 
0 
0% 
5 
5% 
Abdel Fattah El-Sisi 0 
0% 
2 
8.00% 
5 
11.90% 
2 
11.11% 
9 
9% 
Amr Moussa 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
4.76% 
0 
0% 
2 
2% 
Khairat El Shater 0 
0% 
1 
4.00% 
2 
4.76% 
0 
0% 
3 
3% 
Mohamed Saad El-
Katatni 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
2.38% 
0 
0% 
1 
1% 
Ayman Nour 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
2.38% 
0 
0% 
1 
1% 
Hisham Qandil 3 
20.00% 
3 
12.00% 
2 
4.76% 
4 
22.22% 
12 
12% 
Ahmed Shafik 1 
6.67% 
1 
4.00% 
0 
0% 
1 
5.55% 
3 
3% 
Others  1 
6.67% 
2 
8.00% 
2 
4.76% 
0 
0% 
5 
5% 
Total 15 
100% 
25 
100% 
42 
100% 
18 
100% 
100 
100% 
 
 69 
 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of Political Figures mentioning 
 
Frames used for the political parties  
         The “conflict” frame had the highest percentage of usage for the political parties with 
(57.1%, n=28), and in the second place came the “responsibility” frame with (28.6%, n=14), 
the third frame in terms of percentage was the “morality” frame (12.2.%, n=6), and the 
“economics consequences” came in the forth place (2.0%, n=1) and there was no usage of 
the “human interest” frame for the political parties. 
 
         The frames used for El-Horeya Wel-Adala were the “conflict” frame in the first place 
(42.8%, n=6), then “responsibility” (35.7%, n=5), Morality (14.3%, n=2), in addition the 
solo use of the “economic consequences” was for El-Horeya Wel-Adala (7.1%, n=1). 
 
         Al-Nour party has equal representation of both frames “responsibility” and “conflict” 
frames with (40.0%, n=2) for each, while “morality” came in the third place with (20.0%, 
n=1), and no use of either “human interests” nor “economic consequences” frames in any 
mentioning of the party. Al-Wasat party had the highest percentage of using “conflict” frame 
in their news coverage with (80.0%, n=4) while “responsibility” frame came next with 
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(20.0%, n=1), and no usage of the “human interests”, “economic consequences” or 
“morality”. The “conflict” frame was used for Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar political party (100%, 
n=1) while there were no mentions of other frames. 
 
         Al-Wafd was framed mainly by “conflict” frame (42,8%, n=3), and similar distribution 
of both frames “responsibility” and “morality” with (28.6%, n=2) for each. Strong Egypt 
party was framed only by “conflict” frame (100%, N=3), and there were no using of other 
frames. The existence of many zeros does not allow the chi square test. 
Table 8: Frames used for each of the political parties 
 Frequency (%) of Frames  
Political Parties Responsibility  Human 
Interest 
Conflict  Economics 
consequences  
Morality  Total  
El-Horeya 
Wel-Adala 
5 
35.7% 
0 
0% 
6 
42.8% 
1 
7.1% 
2 
14.3% 
14 
100% 
Al-Nour 2 
40.0% 
0 
0% 
2 
40.0% 
0 
0% 
1 
20.0% 
5 
100% 
Al-Wasat 1 
20.00% 
0 
0% 
4 
80.00% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
5 
100% 
AlMasreyeen 
Al-Ahrar 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
100% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
100% 
AL-Wafd 2 
28.6% 
0 
0% 
3 
42.8% 
0 
0% 
2 
28.6% 
7 
100% 
Al-
Tagamouee 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
Strong 
Egypt 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
100% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
100% 
Al-Tahalof 
El-Shaaby 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
The Egy. 
Democrat 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
Others  4 
28.6% 
0 
0% 
9 
64.3% 
0 
0% 
1 
7.1% 
14 
100% 
Total 14 
28.6% 
0 
0% 
28 
57.1% 
1 
2.0% 
6 
12.2% 
49 
100% 
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Figure 8: Distribution of frames of political parties 
 
Frames used for the political movements and pressure groups 
         The “conflict” frame came on the top of the used frames for the Political movements 
and pressure groups with (48.6%, n=85), the second most used frame is “responsibility” with 
(26.8%, n= 47), while the third used frame is “morality” with (17.1%, n=30), the forth used 
frame is “human interest” with (4.0%, n=7), and the fifth one is “economic consequences” 
with (3.4%, n=6). 
      
         Gabhet Al-Inqaz “The National Salvation Front” is framed mainly by the “conflict” 
frame (64.7%, n=11), and “responsibility” frame with (23.5%, m=4), and “morality” frame 
with low percentage (11.8%, n=2), while there both “human interest” and “economic 
consequences” frames were never used.  
 
         The Muslim Brotherhood Group was framed mainly by the “conflict” frame (36.9%, 
n=31), followed by “responsibility” frame (30.9%, n=26), “morality” frame with (16.7%, n-
14), “human-interest” frame with (8.3%, n=7) and “economic consequences” with (7.1%, 
n=6). 
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         Tamarod movement had distribution of frames between three main categories, 
“conflict” frame (50.0%, n=9), responsibility frame (35.0%, n=7) and morality frame 
(15.0%, n=3) and no usage of either “human interest” or “economic consequences” frames. 
 
         Gabhet El Dameer was framed mainly by “conflict” frame with (66.7%, n=2) while 
framed by “morality” with (33.3%, n=1) and no other frames were used. 6th of April 
movement was framed mainly by both “conflict” frame (60%, n=3) and “morality” frame 
(40%, n=2). 
 
         Al-Dawa Al-Salafiya was framed only by “conflict” (100%, n=1) while El Gamaa Al-
Islamiyya was framed by three frames; “conflict” (50.0%, n=3), “responsibility” (33.3%, 
n=2)) and “morality” (16.7%, n=1). Meanwhile, Abu Ismail supporters’ Hazemoon was 
mentioned by two frames; “conflict” (50%, n=1) and morality (50%, n=1). 
 
         The liberal forces and Islamist forces have the same used three frames. The liberal 
forces were framed by “conflict” (56%, n=9), “morality” (25.0%, n=4) and “responsibility” 
(18.7%, n=3). While the Islamist forces in general were framed by “conflict” (58.8%, n=10), 
“responsibility” (29.4%, n=5) and “morality” (11.8%, n=2). Test of Chi Square will be bias 
due to the many zeroes.  
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Table 9: Frames used for the political movements and pressure groups 
Political Movements 
& pressure groups 
Frequency (%) of Frames  
Responsibility Human interest Conflict 
Economic 
consequences Morality Total 
Gabhet Al-Inqaz 4 
23.5% 
0 
0% 
11 
64.7% 
0 
0% 
2 
11.8% 
17 
100% 
MB 26 
30.9% 
7 
8.3% 
31 
36.9% 
6 
7.1% 
14 
16.7% 
84 
100% 
Tamarod  7 
35.0% 
0 
0% 
10 
50.0% 
0 
0% 
3 
15.0% 
20 
100% 
Gabhet El Dameer 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
66.7% 
0 
0% 
1 
33.3% 
3 
100% 
6th of April 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
60% 
0 
0% 
2 
40% 
5 
100% 
Salafists Daawa 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
100% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
100% 
AlGamaa AIslamiyya 2 
33.3% 
0 
0% 
3 
50.0% 
0 
0% 
1 
16.7% 
6 
100% 
Abu Ismaiel 
supporters 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
50% 
0 
0% 
1 
50% 
2 
100% 
The liberal forces  3 
18.7% 
0 
0% 
9 
56.3% 
0 
0% 
4 
25.0% 
16 
100% 
The Islamists forces 5 
29.4% 
0 
0% 
10 
58.8% 
0 
0% 
2 
11.8% 
17 
100% 
Others* 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
4 
100% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
4 
100% 
Total 47 26.8% 
7 
4.0% 
85 
48.6% 
6 
3.4% 
30 
17.1% 
175  
100% 
 
 
Figure 9: Frame used for political movement and pressure groups 
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Frames for each of the political figures 
         The “conflict” frame had the highest percentage of framing the political figures 
(34.2%, n=55), while “responsibility” comes in the second place with (39.8%, n=64), 
“morality” (14.3%, n=23), “human interests (6.8%, n=11) and “economic consequences” 
(5.0%, n=8). 
 
         The Former Egyptian Mohamed Morsi was framed with the five tested frames; 
“responsibility” (39.8%, n=39), Conflict (30.6%, n=30), morality (16.3%, n=16), “human 
interest” (8.2%, n=8), “economic consequences” (5.1%, n=5); While Abdel Fattah El-Sisi 
was framed by two main frames; “responsibility” (75%, n=9) and “morality” (25%, n=3). 
Meanwhile Ahmed Shafik was framed (100%, n=3) by “conflict” frame only.  
 
         Mohamed ElBaradei was framed (100%, n=2) with “conflict” frame, and Hamdeen 
Sabahi was framed with “conflict” (57.1%, n=4), “responsibility” (28.6%, n=2), and 
“morality” (14.3%, n=1). The general Muslim brotherhood leader Mohamed Badie was 
framed equally with “conflict” frame (50.0%, n=4), “responsibility” frame (25%, n=2)  and 
“morality” frame (25%, n=2), while khairat el Shater, the leading MB figure, was framed by 
“conflict” frame (75%, n=3) and “responsibility” frame equally (25%, n=1).  
 
         Amr Moussa was framed by “conflict” (50%, n=1), “responsibility” (50%, n=1), while 
Ayman Nour was framed (100%, n=1) by “conflict” frame, meanwhile Saad El-katatni was 
framed by “conflict” (100%, n=1). Hisham Qandil, the prime minister at that time, was 
framed by “conflict” (25.0%, n=4), “responsibility” with (43.8%, n=7), and “human interest” 
(12.5%, n=2) and “economic consequences” with (18.8%, n=3) Chi square was not test due 
to too many zeroes.  
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Table 10: Frames used for each of the political figures 
Political figures Frequency (%) of Frames 
Responsibility Human 
interest 
Conflict Economics 
consequences 
Morality Total 
Mohamed Morsi 39 
39.8% 
8 
8.2% 
30 
30.6% 
5 
5.1% 
16 
16.3% 
98 
100% 
Mohamed Badie 2 
25% 
0 
0% 
4 
50.0% 
0 
0% 
2  
25% 
8  
100% 
Mohamed 
ElBaradei 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2  
100% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2  
100% 
Hamdeen Sabahi 2 
28.6% 
0 
0% 
4  
57.1% 
0 
0% 
1  
14.3% 
7 
100% 
Abdel Fattah El-Sisi 9 
75% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3  
25% 
12 
100% 
Amr Moussa 1 
50% 
0 
0% 
1 
50% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
100% 
Khairat El Shater 1 
25% 
0 
0% 
3 
75% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
4 
100% 
Saad El-Katatni 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1  
100% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1  
100% 
Ayman Nour 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
100% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
100% 
Hisham Qandil 7 
43.8% 
2  
12.5% 
4  
25.0% 
3 
18.8% 
0 
0% 
16 
100% 
Ahmed Shafik 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3  
100% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
100% 
Others* 3 
42.8% 
1 
14.3% 
2 
28.6% 
0 
0% 
1 
14.3% 
7 
100% 
Total 64 
39.8% 
11 
6.8% 
55 
34.2% 
8 
5.0% 
23  
14.3% 
161 
100% 
 
 
Figure 10: distribution of frames 2 (Political figures) 
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Frames used by Liberal, Government, Islamist newspapers. 
         The four newspapers were most likely to use both frames “conflict” and 
“responsibility” in portraying all the political forces. El-Horeya Wel-Adala used 
“responsibility” frame (39.0%. n=26), while used “conflict” (24.0%, n=16) from the total 
news items that have mentioned the political forces. Youm7 and AL-Masry El Youm used 
“responsibility” frame with (31.0%, n=86) and “conflict” frame (46.0%, n=126).  
 
         At the same time Al-Ahram used mostly the “conflict” frame to portray the political 
forces (46%, n=16), followed by the “responsibility” frame (43%, n=15), the “human 
interests” frame (9%, n==3), while the “economic consequences’ frame were the least used 
one in the newspaper (3%, n=1). 
 
         Both liberal independent and Islamist newspapers used Morality frame with high 
percentage of the coverage, Liberal independent newspapers used the morality frame 
(18.0%. n=49) from their total coverage of political forces and in a higher percentage than 
El-Horeya Wel-Adala (15.0%. n=10), while Al-Ahram didn’t use the “morality” frame in 
any of their coverage of the political forces. 
 
         “Economic consequences” were most likely to be used in the Islamist media (17.0%, 
n=11) while the same frame counts in the liberal newspapers was (1.0%, n=3),“Human 
Interest” was the least likely used frame in the Islamist newspaper (5.0%, N=3), while it 
scored a slightly higher percentage in the liberal newspapers (4.0%, n=12).  
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Table 11: Distribution of Frames in the Islamist newspaper 
Political 
forces 
Frequency (# of sheets) and % 
El-Horeya Wel-Adala Newspaper Frames 
Responsibility Human interest Conflict 
Economics 
consequences Morality 
Political 
parties 
7 
37.0% 
0 
0.0% 
7 
37.0% 
1 
5.0% 
4 
21.0% 
Political 
movements 
 7 
37.0% 
0 
0 
7 
37.0% 
2 
11.0% 
3 
15.0% 
Political 
figures 
12 
43.0% 
3 
11.0% 
2 
7.0% 
8 
28.0% 
3 
11.0% 
Total forces 26 
39.0% 
3 
5.0% 
16 
24.0% 
11 
17.0% 
10 
15.0% 
 
 
         The liberal newspaper were more likely to use the “conflict” frame in their coverage 
(46%, n=126), “responsibility” came in the second place (31.0%, n=86), while “morality” 
frame came in the third place “(19.0%, n=49) from the total coverage. Both “human interest” 
and “economic consequences” frames scored very little percentage of the coverage 
respectively (4.0%, n=12) and (1.0%, n=3). 
 
Responsibility	
39%
Human	Interest	
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Conflict	
24%
Economic	
consequences	
17%
Morality	
15%
Distribution of Frames in Islamist media 
Responsibility	
Human	Interest	
Conflict	
Economic	consequences	
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Table 12:Distribution of Frames in the Liberal Newspapers 
Political 
forces  
 Frequency (# of sheets) and % 
 Youm7 & Al Masry El-Youm Frames 
 
Responsibility Human 
interest 
Conflict Economics 
consequences 
Morality 
Political 
parties 
4 
16.0% 
0 
  
19 
76.0% 
0 
0.0% 
2 
8.0% 
Political 
movements 
42 
30.0% 
7 
5.0% 
61 
44.0% 
2 
1.0% 
27 
19.0% 
Political 
figures 
40 
36.0% 
5 
4.0% 
46 
41.0% 
1 
1% 
20 
18.0% 
Total forces 
86 
31.0% 
12 
4.0% 
126 
46.0% 
3 
1.0% 
49 
18.0% 
 
 
Figure 11:Distribution of Frames in the liberal newspapers 
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Table 13: Distribution of Frames in Al-Ahram Newspaper 
Political 
forces  
Frequency (# of sheets) and % 
Al-Ahram frames  
 
Total 
Responsibility Human 
interest 
Conflict Economics 
consequences 
Morality 
Political 
parties 
2 
50% 
0 
0% 
2 
50% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
4 
100% 
Political 
movements 
1 
10% 
0 
0% 
9 
90% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
10 
100% 
Political 
figures 
12 
57% 
3 
14% 
5 
24% 
1 
5% 
0 
0% 
21 
100% 
Total forces 15 
43% 
3 
9% 
16 
46% 
1 
3% 
0 
0% 
35 
100% 
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Figure 12: Frames of Political parties 
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Figure 13: Frames of political movements & pressure groups 
 
Figure 14: Frames of the political figures 
 
 
 
 
 
ISLAMIC LIBERAL GOVERNMENT
37% 30%
10%
5%
37% 44% 90%
11% 1%
15% 19%
FRAMES OF POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN ISLAMIC,  
LIBERAL AND GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPERS
Responsibility Human interest
Conflict Economics consequences
I S L A M I C L I B E R A L G O V E R N M E N T
43% 36%
57%
11%
4%
14%7% 41%
24%28% 1%
5%11% 18%
FRAME S OF POL IT ICAL  FIGURE S IN ISL AMIC,  L IBE RAL  
AND GOVE RNME NT  NE W SPAPE RS
Responsibility Human interest
Conflict Economics consequences
Morality
 82 
 
Distribution of frames in details 
A- Political parties  
Table 14:Frames used by Islamist newspaper El-Horeya Wel-Adala 
Political 
parties 
El-Horeya  Wel-Adala Newspaper frames 
Responsibility Human 
Interest 
Conflict Economic 
Consequences 
Morality Total 
FJP 3 0 1 1 2 7 
Al-Nour 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Al-Wasat 1 0 2 0 0 3 
Al-Masreyeen 
Al-Ahrar 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Al Wafd 1 0 1 0 2 4 
Strong Egypt   0 1 0 0 1 
Others  1 0 2 0  3 
Total 7 0 7 1 4 19 
 
 
Table 15:Frames of political parties used by the independent newspapers 
Political 
parties 
Youm7 & Al-Masry El Youm Frames 
Responsibility 
Human 
Interest 
Conflict 
Economic 
Consequences 
Morality 
Total 
FJP 1 0 5 0 0 6 
Al-Nour 1 0 2 0 1 4 
Al-Wasat 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Al-Masreyeen 
Al -Ahrar 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Al-Wafd 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Strong Egypt 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Others 2 0 5 0 1 8 
Total 4 0 19 0 2 25 
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Table 16:Frames of political parties in Al-Ahram 
Political 
parties 
Youm7 & Al-Masry El Youm Frames  
Responsibility Human 
Interest 
Conflict Economic 
Consequences 
Morality Total 
FJP 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Al-Nour 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Al-Wasat 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Al-
Masreyeen 
Al -Ahrar 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Al-Wafd 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Strong 
Egypt 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others 1 0 2 0 0 3 
Total 2 0 2 0 0 4 
 
B- Political Movements and Pressure Groups 
Table 17:Frames of movements and pressure groups in El-Horeya Wel-Adala 
Political 
movement
s and 
pressure 
groups 
El-Horeya  Wel-Adala Newspaper Frames 
Responsibility Human 
interest 
Conflict Economics 
consequences 
Morality Total 
Gabhet Al-
Inqaz 
1  0 3 0 0 4 
MB  5  0 1 2 1 9 
Tamarod  0 0 1 0 1 2 
Gabhet 
Eldameer  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
6th of 
April  
0  0 1 0 1 2 
Salafists 
Daawa  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Al-Gamaa 
Al 
Islamiyya 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Abu 
Ismaiel 
supporters 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
The liberal 
forces in 
general 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
The 
Islamists 
forces in 
general 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 7 0 6 2 3 18 
 84 
 
 
Table 18: Frames of movements and pressure groups in the independent newspapers 
Political 
movements 
and pressure 
groups 
Youm7 & Al Masry El-Youm Frames 
Responsibility Human Interest Conflict 
Economic 
consequences Morality 
Total 
Gabhet Al-
Inqaz 
3 0 7 0 2 12 
Muslim 
Brotherhood  
24 7 21 2 13 67 
Tamarod 
movement 
7 0 8 0 2 17 
Gabhet El 
Dameer 
movement 
0 0  2 0  1 3 
6th of April 
movement 
0 0  1 0  1 2 
Salafists 
Daawa 
movement 
0 0  1 0 0 1 
Al Gamaa  
Al Islamiyya 
2 0 2 0 1 5 
Abu Ismaiel 
supporters 
0 0  1 0  1 2 
The liberal 
forces in 
general 
3 0 7 0 4 14 
The 
Islamists 
forces in 
general 
3 0 8 0 2 13 
Others  0 0 3 0 0 3 
Total  42 7 61 2 27 139 
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Table 19: Frames used by Al-Ahram newspaper 
Political 
movements 
and 
pressure 
groups 
Youm7 & Al Masry El-Youm Frames 
Responsibility Human 
Interest 
Conflict Economic 
consequences 
Morality Total 
Gabhet Al-
Inqaz 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Muslim 
Brotherhoo
d Group 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Tamarod 
movement 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Gabhet El 
Dameer 
movement 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
6th of 
April 
movement 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Salafists 
Daawa 
movement 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Al Gamaa  
Al 
Islamiyya 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Abu 
Ismaiel 
supporters 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
The liberal 
forces in 
general 
0 0 2 0 0 2 
The 
Islamists 
forces in 
general 
1 0 2 0 0 3 
Others  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  1 0 9 0 0 10 
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C- Political figures  
Table 20:Frames of Political forces in El-Horeya Wel-Adala 
Political 
figures 
El-Horeya Wel-Adala Newspaper Frames 
Responsibility Human 
interest 
Conflict Economics 
consequences 
Morality Total 
Mohamed 
Morsi 
9 2 1 4 3 19 
Mohamed 
Badie 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Mohamed 
ElBaradei 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Hamdeen 
Sabahi 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Abdel 
Fattah El-
Sisi 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Amr 
Moussa 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Khairat El 
Shater 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saad El-
Katatni 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ayman 
Nour 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hisham 
Qandil 
2 1 0 2 0 5 
Ahmed 
Shafik 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
Others 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 12 3 2 8 3 28 
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Table 21: Frames of political figure in the independent newspapers 
Political 
figures 
 Youm7 & Al Masry El-Youm Frames 
Responsibility Human 
interest 
Conflict Economics 
consequences 
Morality Total 
Mohamed 
Morsi 
23 4 27 1 13 68 
Mohamed 
Badie 
1  0 3 0 2 6 
Mohamed 
ElBaradei 
0   0 1 0 0 1 
Hamdeen 
Sabahi 
2 0 4 0 1 7 
Abdel 
Fattah El-
Sisi 
7 0 0 0 3 10 
Amr 
Moussa 
1 0 1 0 0 2 
Khairat El 
Shater 
1 0 3 0 0 4 
Mohamed 
Saad El-
Katatni 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Ayman 
Nour 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Hisham 
Qandil 
2 0 3 0 0 5 
Ahmed 
Shafik 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Others 3 1 1 0 1 6 
Total 40 5 46 1 20 112 
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Table 22: Frames used of political figure in Al-Ahram 
Political 
figures 
 Youm7 & Al Masry El-Youm Frames 
Responsibility Human 
interest 
Conflict Economics 
consequences 
Morality Total 
Mohamed 
Morsi 
7 2 2 0 0 11 
Mohamed 
Badie 
0  0 1 0 0 1 
Mohamed 
ElBaradei 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hamdeen 
Sabahi 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Abdel 
Fattah El-
Sisi 
2 0 0 0 0 2 
Amr 
Moussa 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Khairat El 
Shater 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mohamed 
Saad El-
Katatni 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ayman 
Nour 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hisham 
Qandil 
3 1 1 1 0 6 
Ahmed 
Shafik 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 12 3 5 1 0 21 
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Mentioning Political forces as source of framing 
          This category examined how the different newspapers used political forces in framing 
other political forces, the category did not look into the normal practice of using political 
forces as general source of information but record them only in case they portrayed other 
political forces.  
 
         This variable was tested on all articles that framed the political forces, the results 
showed the following; the majority of articles did not use any political forces as source of 
framing (77.70%, n=87) against (22.30%, n=25) of the examined articles used political 
forces as source of framing other forces. Youm7 had the highest percentage of using the 
political forces as source in the framing (32.40%, n=11), El-Horeya Wel-Adala comes in 
the second place with (27.30%,  n=6) and followed by Al-Masry El Youm with (15.40%, 
n=6), while Al-Ahram came at the last place (11.80%, n=2). 
 
          The Chi square = 4.459  (p=0.216) not significant indicating almost similar 
distribution of Yes and No for the four newspapers. 
 
Table 23: Political forces as a source of framing 
Response 
Frequency %  
Total El-Horeya 
Wel-Adala 
Youm7 
Al-Masry El 
Youm 
Al-Ahram 
Yes 
6 
27.30% 
11 
32.40% 
6 
15.40% 
2 
11.80% 
25 
22.30% 
No 
16 
72.70% 
23 
67.60% 
33 
84.60% 
15 
88.20% 
87 
77.70% 
Total 
22 
100.00% 
34 
100.00% 
39 
100.00% 
17 
100.00% 
112 
100.00% 
 
 90 
 
 
Figure 15: Distribution of Political forces as sources 
 
Using Political parties as source in framing other political forces  
          The results showed that El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper used Al Wafd party as a 
source of framing other forces on the tops of its list (66.67%, n=2), and Freedom and justice 
party with (33.33%, n=1).  While Youm7 used Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar and Al-Nour parties 
equally (50.00%, n=1) for each. AL-Masry Al-Youm used Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar party as 
a source (33.33%, n=2), while Al-Wasat party and Freedom and justice party (16.67%, n=1), 
Al-Wafd party, Strong Egypt party, and other party with the same percentage (16.67, n=1). 
At the same time Al-Ahram used Freedom and Justice party on the top of their source list 
with (50.0%, n=2) and Al-Wafd with (25.0%, n=1).  
  
         Chi square will be biased due to many zeros, and the number of responses are too 
small (15) mostly from Al-Masry Al -Youm and Al-Ahram newspapers (10 out of 15) . 
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Table 24: Political parties as source of framing 
Political 
Parties 
Frequency (%) of Newspaper name Total 
El-Horeya  
Wel-Adala 
Youm7 Al-Masry El 
Youm 
Al-Ahram 
FJP 1 
33.33% 
0 
0% 
1 
16.7% 
2 
50% 
4 
26.7% 
Al-Nour  0 
0%  
1 
50% 
0 
0%  
0 
0% 
1 
6.7% 
Al-Masreyeen 
Al-Ahrar  
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
33.3% 
0 
0% 
2 
13.3% 
Al-Wafd  2 
66.7% 
1 
50%  
0 
0% 
1 
25% 
4 
26.7% 
Al-
Tagamouee  
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
16.7% 
0 
0% 
1 
6.7% 
Al Tahalouf el 
Shaaby  
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
16.7% 
0 
0% 
1 
6.7% 
The Egyptian 
Democratic  
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
16.7% 
0 
0% 
1 
6.7% 
Others* 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
25% 
1 
6.7% 
Total 
  
3 
100% 
2 
100% 
6 
100% 
4 
100% 
15 
100% 
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Figure 16: Distribution of Political Parties as sources 
 
 
Figure 17: Distribution of Political parties as News sources 
 
Political movements and pressure groups as source of framing other political forces  
 
          El-Horeya Wel-Adala used Muslim Brotherhood only (100%, n=2) as source of 
framing, while Youm7 used Gahbet Al-Inqaz (20%, n=1), Muslim brotherhood group (20%, 
n=1), Tamroud Movement (40%, n=2) and Al-Dawa Al-Salafiya (20%, n=1), while Al-
Masry El Youm used Muslim Brotherhood Group (60%, n=3), Tamarod (20%, n=1). Al-
Ahram did not mention any of the political movement except Gabhet Ak-Inqaz (100%, n=1).  
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Table 25:Political movements and pressure groups as source of framing 
Political 
movements 
and pressure 
groups 
Frequency (%) of Newspaper name 
Total El-Horeya 
Wel-Adala Youm7 
Al-Masry 
AL-Youm 
Al-Ahram 
Gabhet Al-
Inqaz 
0 
0% 
1 
20% 
0 
0% 
1 
100% 
2 
8.33% 
Muslim 
Brotherhood  
2 
100% 
1 
20% 
3 
60% 
0 
0% 
6 
50% 
Tamarod 
movement 
0 
0% 
2 
40% 
1 
20% 
0 
0% 
3 
25% 
Salafists 
Daawa  
0 
0% 
1 
20% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
8.33% 
Others* 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
20% 
0 
0% 
1 
8.33% 
Total 2 
100% 
5 
100% 
5 
100% 
1 
100% 
13 
100% 
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Figure 18: distribution of movements as framing sources 
 
 
 
   
Figure 19: Distribution of Political movements and pressure groups as news sources 
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Political figures as a source of framing  
 
               El-Horeya Wel-Adala used only Hisham Qandil as a source of framing (100%, 
n=1), while Youm7 used Mohamed Badie (14.29%, n=1), Mohamed ElBaradei (14.29%, 
n=1), Khaled Aly (14.29%, n=1) and Hisham Qandil (14.29%, n=1). Meanwhile Al-Masry 
El Youm used Mohamed ElBaradei (25%, n=1), Hamdeen Sabahi (25%, n=1), Amr 
Moussa (25%, n=1). While Al-Ahram did not use any of the political forces as a source of 
framing.  
Table 26: Political figures as a source of news 
Political figures Frequency (%) of Newspaper name Total 
El-Horeya 
Wel-Adala 
Youm7 Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Al-
Ahram 
Mohamed 
Badie 
0 
0%  
1 
14.29% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
8.33% 
Mohamed 
ElBaradei 
0 
0%  
1 
14.29% 
1 
25% 
0 
0% 
2 
16.67% 
Hamdeen 
Sabahi 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
25% 
0 
0% 
1 
8.33% 
Amr Moussa 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
25% 
0 
0% 
1 
8.33% 
Khaled Aly 0 
0%  
1 
14.29% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
8.33% 
Hisham Qandil 1 
100% 
1 
14.29% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
16.67% 
Others 0 
0%  
3 
42.85% 
1 
25% 
0 
0% 
4 
33.33% 
Total 1 
100% 
7 
100% 
4 
100% 
0 
0% 
12 
100% 
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Figure 20: Distribution of Political figures as source of framing 
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Figure 21: Political figures as source of framing 
 
Answering the research questions 
There are two broad questions this study is trying to answer 
RQ1: How were the political forces framed in El-Horeya Wel-Adala, Youm7, Al Masry 
El Youm  and Al-Ahram  newspapers’ front pages coverage? 
 
Conflict frame  
 
          The “conflict” was the dominant frame for the three newspaper Al-Ahram, Youm7 
and Al-Masry Al-Youm in framing the Political forces; the “conflict” frame referred to a 
high political tension between different political figures, parties, movements and ideologies, 
which was represented in the coverage of the political news.  
 
         By dividing the sampled newspapers into three main categories; liberal independent 
newspapers, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Youm7; Islamist partisan, El-Horeya Wel-Adala and state-
run newspaper Al-Ahram, and by studying the frames of each group, the results showed that 
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the “conflict” frame was used on both level negative and positive sides. El-Horeya Wel-
Adala newspaper framed the conflict between the different political parties from both views, 
the positive conflict from the side of the Muslim Brotherhood, the former president 
Mohamed Morsi, and other Islamist forces as being a tool to defend the interest of the 
country and respecting democracy. The newspaper framed the protests against the president 
and the political turbulences as a conflict between revolution and Mubarak, and had powerful 
headlines like “Massive protest to protect Sharia or “the legitimacy of the democratic 
elected president” and framed the opposition protests as being a part of a conspiracy against 
the revolution.   
 
         While the liberal independent newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm framed the president 
speeches with “conflict” frame with main headline saying “Morsi’s speech increase the 
polarization and incite the revolution”, while calling at the same piece Morsi’s oppositions 
as “Revolutionaries” and Morsi’s supporters as “Islamist forces” who support only the 
president. Another news item at Al-Masry Al-Youm said “The revolutionaries of Tunisia 
are back to the streets, and the Egyptians are getting ready to do the same”.  
 
          Youm7 used “conflict” frame to portray all the political forces with powerful and bias 
words mainly in the headlines and with more decent coverages in the news bodies; as 
example “Port Saied defeat the president decrees and the city is under the army control” the 
headline in this piece for instance refers to the coastal city Port Said, allocated at the entrance 
of Suez Canal, which had witnessed violent protests at that time and the former president 
Mohamed Morsi issued a decree of continuous curfew in the city till it restored its order, 
while at the body of the news the coverage was totally different than the headline with a 
balanced way of stating what is really happening on the ground.  
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         Al-Ahram used the “conflict’ frame to portray the political tension between the 
political forces and the president. The newspaper used the “conflict’ frame in mentioning 
the political movements, political figure, and the political parties in the examined article.  
 
Responsibility frame  
         This frame can be used in both ways according to which subject the frame is related to 
in the coverage. This frame dominated the coverage in the four newspapers in portraying the 
political forces.  
 
          El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper used the “responsibility” frame in the majority of its 
examined coverage, the newspaper portrayed the Egyptian former president Mohamed 
Morsi, the “Freedom and justice party” and Muslim brotherhood group as being responsible 
political forces toward the national interests and the welfare of the state, also the same applies 
to other Islamist parties. 
 
         The news items at El-Horeya Wel-Adala were partially dedicated to show how the 
Islamist forces were politically responsible of protecting the people’s choices and contribute 
to the development of the national economy, headlines of the newspaper were often around 
the president’s achievements; for example, a main piece of news about Egypt water interests, 
its headline was “Today…The president gives his speech to the national conference of 
protecting the Nile” without mentioning the contribution of other political forces 
participating in the same conference.  
 
         Al-Masry El-Youm and Youm7 used the “responsibility” frame with a less percentage 
than the “conflict” frame, the highest percentage was framing the Islamist forces as one unit 
along with the Freedom and justice party and portraying the MB with “responsibility” frame. 
The headlines in certain cases hold a direct accusation to the Islamist political forces, for 
example Al-Masry Al-Youm headline “An Islamist plan: the attack of the headquarter of 
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“Tamarod” movement and the coordination with collaborative media professionals”. 
Youm7 was likely to use stronger statement in their headlines and news pieces; for example, 
“The continuation of the war of blood between MBs and their oppositions in all 
governorates”.   
 
         While Al-Ahram use the “responsibility” frame in portraying the Islamist political 
forces including the Freedom and Justice party and the MB group, the newspaper used the 
frame is portraying the former president Mohamed Morsi and Hisham Qandil, the prime 
minister at that time. All the framings were in the positive direction. The only non-Islamist 
political figure that was portrayed by the “responsibility” frame was Abdel Fatah El-Sisi, the 
former defense minister and the current Egyptian president.  
 
Economic consequences frame  
This frame can be used in two sides, where the coverage using this frame were usually 
referring to either economical gain or loss.  
 
         El-Horeya Wel-Adala used the “economic consequences” frame mainly when 
speaking about the Freedom and Justice party, the Muslim Brotherhood Group, the Egyptian 
former president Mohamed Morsi, the former prime minister at that time “Hisham Qandil 
and their government as a whole; for example, four headlines around economic 
achievements were posted on one of the front pages along with Hisham Qandil photo 
speaking about different aspect of the economic progress.   
 
         While both liberal independent newspapers barely used the “economic consequences” 
in portraying Mohamed Morsi’s actions and his political party Freedom and Justice party 
and MB group; for example “The petrol in the time of MB, we come to give Egypt the 
welfare” this headline was on the top of one of the front pages of Al-Masry Al-Youm.  
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          Although Al-Ahram newspaper’s front pages dedicated a big percentage to the 
economic news, the newspaper did not use the “economic consequences” in framing the 
political forces except with Hisham Qandil who was framed one time with the economic 
gain of his policies. 
  
Human interest frame  
This frame was carefully examined as many categories of the coverage could be considered 
as “Human interest”.  
 
         The four newspapers did not use this frame in portraying neither political parties nor 
movements, the only political figure who was portrayed with this frame in the front pages 
coverage was Mohamed Morsi.  
 
Morality frame  
This frame is usually used when the news coverage constructs moral judgments toward an 
issue, political figure or a candidate. This frame is very subjective due to the fact that morals 
can be interpreted in different ways.  
 
          “Morality” frame was used by El-Horeya Wel-Adala newapaper to frame the Freedom 
and Justice party, their political alliance at that time Al-Wafd party, The MB group and the 
former president Mohamed Morsi. While the negative use of the frame was directed to both 
Tamarod and 6th of April movements.  
 
          Both liberal independent newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm and Youm7 extensively used 
the “morality” frame in speaking about the majority of the political forces from both sides 
the Islamist and liberal forces. While the only two political figures who were framed 
continuously with “morality” frame were Mohamed Mosri and Abdel Fatah El Sisi. At the 
same time Al-Ahram did not use the “morality” frame in any of the examined coverage.  
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Conclusion of the used frames 
A- Political parties: The “conflict” frame was dominant in framing the political parties, 
followed by the “responsibility” frame, followed by the “morality” frame and at the 
end came both the “economic consequences” and “human interests” frames. 
    
B- Political movements and pressure groups: The “conflict” frame also scored the 
highest percentage from the total coverage, while “responsibility” frame came in the 
second place, “morality” frame came at the third place, “human Interest” was at the 
forth place and “economic consequences” frame was at the end of the list. 
 
C- Political figures: the “responsibility” frame scored the highest percentage in framing 
the political figures, in the second place came the “conflict” frame, while “morality” 
frame came in the third place and the “human interests” and the “Economic 
consequences” frames were at the end of the list. 
 
RQ2: Which political forces were used as sources of news in framing other political 
forces? 
This question is examining another part of the political tension among the different political 
forces which is how newspapers used political forces to frame their political opponents or 
other political forces in general.  
          Only one quarter of the examined articles in the four newspapers used political forces 
as sources of framing other political forces, whether these forces were allies or opponents.  
 
          Youm7 newspaper marked the highest score in using political sources as sources of 
framing, followed by El-Horeya Wel-Adala, then Al-Masry Al-Youm and at the end came 
Al-Ahram. 
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          Freedom and Justice and Al-Wafd political parties marked the highest score of acting 
as sources of framing other political forces.  The Muslim Brotherhood members contributed 
with the high percentage of quotes among political movements and pressure groups, 
followed by Tamarod movement, Gabhet El-Inqaz and Salafist Dawaa. There was no proved 
relation between the ideological affiliation of the chosen political forces to frame others and 
between the ownership of the newspapers.  
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VII. DISCUSSION 
          This study was conducted to explore how the political forces were portrayed in 
different newspapers during a crucial time in the Egyptian political history. The Study 
identified five frames to measure the coverage against; the responsibility, the conflict, the 
economic consequences, human interests and morality.  
 
Opinion Vs. news  
          The quantitative analysis showed that three out of the four examined newspapers have 
dedicated the highest percentage of coverage to the political news which are El-Horeya Wel-
Adala, Youm7 and Al-Masry Al-Youm, While Al-Ahram dedicated the majority of its front 
pages’ coverage to economic news, however, a further look at the news format used in the 
four newspapers’ front pages showed that El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper used main 
headlines extensively on their front pages with a total of (32.20%, n=28). Furthermore, the 
type of the main headlines used by El-Horeya Wel-Adala was unique in the sense that it does 
not come with a news text, the headlines came as flash pieces of news by themselves and 
were not followed by regular news stories, which gave a big space to opinion and subjectivity 
in portraying the news.  
 
          Using headlines and side headlines is an opposite technique to the in-depth coverage 
and the regular format of news, where both news and reports must contain information and 
data. However, El-Horeya Wel-Adala, with its unique technique, was more into the direction 
to promote achievements or what were framed as achievements and create impressions 
toward the Islamist president and his government rather than practicing journalism.  
 
         At the same time, Al-Masry El Youm used the regular news format in more than 50% 
of their front pages’ overage. The newspaper had a constant way of dividing the front page 
into one to two main headlines, a main piece of news and the rest will be more likely to be 
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only news. The front page of Al-Masry El Youm was informative and has news about 
different aspects of the Egyptian scene with less opinionated items.  
 
          Youm7 front page was divided between different types of news format; however, the 
dominant format was the side headline of inside story, which has the similar problem of El-
Horeya Wel-Adala that the headline of inside story is more likely to promote for certain 
political views without giving attention to the details of news. For example, the newspaper 
put two headlines for inside stories on the top of their front page; one was started with 
“Surprise” word and speak about the secret list of Gabhet el Inqaz in the parliamentarian 
elections. While the second one was a direct question saying “Will people signatures return 
the army back to power?” 
 
         Al-Ahram as usual was loyal to its conservative school of coverage where the regular 
piece of news format was dominating the newspaper’s front pages. On the other side the 
newspaper dedicated a bigger space to the regional issues equal to the space the paper 
dedicated to the local politics. The way the newspaper handled the regional news showed an 
indication that the newspaper was working as a mouthpiece for the Islamist regime at that 
time, where the news held the same views of the Muslim Brotherhood toward the regional 
unrest, for example, calling the armed rebellions against both Libya’s and Syria’s 
governments “revolutionaries” could be seen as a political stance. 
 
Defining the political situation  
         Al-Ahram was the only newspaper that had a different distribution of news topics from 
the other three newspapers, the majority of the front pages’ coverage was dedicated to 
economic news while the three newspaper El-Horeya Wel-Adala, Youm7, Al-Masry Al-
Youm directed the majority of their coverage to the local politics. 
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          Al-Masry El Youm and Youm7 were closer to each other in defining the current 
situation at that time than both El-Horeya Wel-Adala and Al-Ahram; nevertheless, each of 
the four had their own definitions and analysis. The words “protestors” and “revolutionaries” 
were used to describe the opposition protests against Morsi in the liberal media while these 
protests were never mentioned in the Islamist media at that time, while the word “opposition” 
was used to describe the political forces protesting against Morsi in Al-Ahram. 
 
          For example, a main headline that was published in El-Horeya Wel-Adala on June 
28th, days before the ousting of Morsi, came with no news story and stated “The aftermath 
of Morsi’s earthquake” referring to the speech he gave at that time. In comparison, Al-Masry 
El Youm put a headline “Morsi’s speech is dividing the nation and incite the revolution”, 
Youm7 chose a sarcastic headline to describe Morsi’s speech by highlighting a sentence that 
showed Morsi as a less smart leader “Morsi: I know who said what and why?”, while Al-
Ahram had the most balanced headline “Morsi’s speech caused more polarization: the 
supporters have a rally today while the oppositions are back to Tahrir square”. 
 
         The two sides of the story were used by both Al-Ahram and Al-Masry El Youm’s main 
pieces of news, however, Al-Masry Al-Youm and as the political conflict escalated, divided 
the main piece of news into two main equal spaces and highlighted the current situation from 
both sides; the case was not the same with the headlines as the newspaper tended to portray 
the protesters as “revolutionaries” and referred to the Muslim Brothers and their alliances as 
Islamic forces in general.   
 
          The differences of coverage between the different types of Egyptian newspapers 
were also shown in Elmasry (2012); Hamdy & Gomaa (2012); ElKamel, (2013). 
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Economic news  
          Economic news came in the first place in Al-Ahram coverage while it came as the 
second most important news to be portrayed in the other three newspapers’ coverage; El-
Horeya Wel-Adala was on the top of the list with (18.60%. n=16), which is too close to the 
political news percentage (20.90%, n=18). The newspaper fully supports the government’s 
economic plans and efforts and highlighted the achievements on daily basis. El-Horeya Wel-
Adala was the mouthpiece of the ruling party Freedom and Justice, and could be considered 
by the ownership type as the state media during Mubarak.  
 
          The importance of the economy news for the newspaper define how the FJP and their 
affiliated media were trying to prove that the president along with his government were 
achieving significant success on the economical side. The newspaper for example used a 
side headline to show the economic achievements of the Ministry of information headed by 
a leading figure of MB, the headline was a quote from the minister referring to achieving 89 
Million of ads revenues without telling the readers what does that mean or without giving 
further information about it.  
 
          The importance of economic news was also shown in the coverage of Al-Ahram, the 
newspaper was highly positive in covering the local economic situation and had a main piece 
of news about the economical achievement in every examined front page. 
  
          While economic news was unlikely to appear in the front-page coverage of both Al-
Masry El Youm and Youm7, the only published economic news were referring to crisis, the 
petrol shortage crisis for example dominated both newspapers coverage and the two pieces 
framed the MB rule as a direct responsible of such a shortage.  
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Mentioning political parties and newspaper ownership 
           More than half of the examined sample had mentioning of the different political 
parties identified by the study and other forces as well, the results showed that Freedom and 
Justice party was the highest mentioned political party in El-Hoerya Wel-Adala, which is 
expected, as the party owns the newspaper. 
 
          Al-Masry El Youm mentioned Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar party by the highest 
percentage among all other political parties. The newspaper had a board of owners, in which 
Naguib Sawiras is one of the shareholders and at the same time he is the founder of Al-
Masreyeen Al-Ahrar political party, so maybe this relation was likely to contribute to the 
coverage of the party on Al-Masry El Youm front pages. 
 
          While Al-Masry El Youm mentioned the FJP as the rest of the political parties, El-
Horeya Wel-Adala didn't mention Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar in neither of their coverage. Both 
Al-Wasat and Al-Wafd political parties were mentioned in El-Horeya Wel-Adala by the 
second-high percentage, both parties were political allies of the FJP. While Al-Masry Al-
Youm mentioned equally the FJP, Al Nour, Al Wasat and strong Egypt political parties. 
 
          Al-Ahram was the least newspaper that mentioned political parties, the only 
mentioned party was the Freedom and Justice party, while the paper referred mainly to the 
other political parties as “oppositions”. 
 
          Youm7 mentioned both FJP and Al Nour parties equally with the highest percentage, 
never mentioned Al-Masreyeen El Ahrar, and mentioned both Al-Wafd and Strong Egypt 
equally and with less percentage.  
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Political forces  
         The main liberal pillars of June 30th scene were Gabhet El Inqaz, Tamarod movement, 
and the army against the Muslim Brothers, President Morsi and their allies. The main focus 
of El-Horeya Wel-Adala were the news of the Muslim Brotherhood organization and its 
members, while Gabhet el Inqaz wan mentioned with a high percentage in the front pages of 
the newspaper, framing them as being the responsible of all the political unrest occurred in 
Egypt before June 30th.  
 
         At the same time and surprisingly both Al-Masry El Youm and Youm7 dedicated less 
percentage of news items to both Gabhet el Inqaz and Tamarod movements against the high 
percentage they give to MB news which dominated the two newspaper’s front pages.  
 
          Mentioning the Islamist forces in general came at the first place in Youm7 while Al-
Masry El Youm made a less generalization when covering the news of the Islamist camp. In 
comparison El-Horeya Wel-Adala never labeled the liberal political forces in general as 
“Liberal forces”. In that sense the liberal media was likely to use more generalization when 
it comes to covering the Islamist forces than the Islamist media covering the liberal one. 
 
         Al-Ahram was the least likely to mention any political forces; with the least percentage 
of mentioning of the political forces, the newspaper was referring to the Islamist forces in 
general as the president supporters, and to the liberal forces as oppositions.  
      
          The Muslim Brotherhood was the main focus of the three newspapers in covering 
the news; even when Morsi was mentioned, his political party, which he was elected 
within, was outlined as well.  
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Mohamed Morsi Vs Abdel Fatah El Sisi 
          Mohamed Morsi was the highest mentioned political figures in the four newspapers, 
slightly more in El-Horeya Wel Adala, which is expected as he was the main political figure 
as the president and as a leading figure for the Muslim brotherhood. 
 
          Abdel Fatah El Sisi, the current Egyptian President and the Minister of Defense at the 
time of Morsi’s rule was mentioned in the liberal newspapers and Al-Ahram many times 
with a “responsibility” frame. The relation between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood 
was discussed in an open way in the liberal media, where even a question whether the army 
will remove Morsi’s regime in the near future was raised. While Al-Ahram put two identical 
headlines on two front pages of two different dates stating the El-Sisi is continuing to foster 
the level of the Egyptian army, the two headlines had no specific events.  
 
          In contrast, although El-Horeya Wel-Adala always mentioned the army as being the 
savior and the main arm of the nation, they never mentioned Abdel Fatah El Sisi in any of 
their coverage. 
  
          Although Mohamed El Baradee and Hamdeen Sabahi were framed at that time as 
being the main challengers to Morsi, the two liberal newspapers Al-Masry El Youm and 
Youm7 along with the governmental newspaper Al-Ahram did not give them great attention 
in the coverage, while El Sisi was promoted as the responsible political figure by a higher 
percentage of news in the three papers. In comparison El-Horeya Wel-Adala saw both 
ElBaradei and Ahmed Sahfiq as the main challengers of Morsi’s post.  
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
          The study was conducted to explore how the different newspapers framed the involved 
political forces that were engaged in the pre-June 30th  political scene framed by the Islamist, 
liberal and government newspapers.  
 
          The study found that the four newspapers did not give a perfect example in separating 
their political affiliations and the coverage of the political situation, although Al-Masry El 
Youm presented a more professional way of tackling the news, it promoted also for certain 
political directions including endorsing the army interfering in the political process again.  
 
          The differences in the four newspapers’ definitions of the current political situation at 
that time was a tool for political polarization more than serving the readers’ interests. The 
dominant news format in many Egyptian newspapers, the flash headlines, should be 
eliminated from the news coverage, as it is a tool of mixing both opinions with news and 
creating impressions rather than creating awareness and spread knowledge. 
 
          The media in Egypt contributed to deepening the polarization and the conflicts 
between different groups in Egypt in the past and will continue to perform this task as long 
as the same techniques are used in the coverage and as long as the communicators and 
journalists will be submitted to the ownership restrictions and interests.  
 
          The independent media in Egypt needs to endorse their professional standards through 
continuous capacity buildings and through following code of conduct that will make the 
journalism practicing to not being affected by the owners’ influence.  
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            Free press is the main pillar for any development around the world and Egypt in its 
critical and important transitional period in 2016 needs a free and unrestrained press that can 
contribute to the overall national goals and serve the readers’ rights of knowledge.  
 
          On the other side, it is crucial to have available national archive to preserve all the 
publications and protect it from being lost with all the important findings and data that could 
come out of it and it is crucial also that such archive will be in the hand of media persons or 
academics. 
 
          On the political side the study showed that Muslim Brotherhood group was considered 
as the main governor of Egypt and not Mohamed Morsi, as the four newspapers mentioned 
the MB in all types of conflict and political situations while the FJP, the ruling party, was 
not on the same level of importance. Also the former minister of defense Abdel Fatah El-
Sisi was promoted and endorsed by the Egyptian media before June 30th to play a role in 
Egypt future.  
 
Limitations of the study 
1- The study can not be generalized, as the Islamist sample El-Horeya Wel-Adala 
newspaper was not enough to understand the whole sphere of the political Islam and 
Media. 
2- The other Islamist newspapers that contributed to the political conflict during 
Mohamed Morsi no longer exist in 2016. The Egyptian authorities closed the 
majority of the newspapers and media channels after the June 30th uprising.  
3- The only time period found for the archive of El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper was 
limited to the early six months just right before June 30th and in only one place in 
Egypt which Dar El Kotob “The National archive of books” 
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4- The study wished to include Al-Nour newspaper, the official newspaper of Al-Nour 
Salafists Party or Al-Fath newspaper, another newspaper of Al-Nour Party, however, 
the researcher could not allocate any of their issues and by contacting Al-Nour Party 
for assistance there was no positive response in that sense.  
Suggestions of Future research 
          The Islamist media is still a big field to be examined, the full six months of El-Horeya 
Wel-Adala which exists at the Dar El Kotob “The National Archive of Books”, the official 
body of documentation, should be examined for more results and for understanding how the 
media contributed to the polarized situation at that time.  
 
          Also the effects of using these frames in the two types of newspapers can be examined 
thoroughly in a further study.  
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Coding Sheet  
Coder Name:  
 
News item ID#  
 
Date of the news item:  
 
Newspaper Name 
1= El-Horeya  Wel-Adala;   2= Youm7;   3=Al-Masry El Youm; 4=Al-Ahram  
 
Format of the News item 
1= Main headline;  2= Main Piece of News;   3= news;   4= Cartoon;   5= Opinion;  6= 
picture; 7=Headline of inside story; 8=Side Headline 
 
Primary topic of the News item  
1= Local Politics; 2= Local Economics;  3= Security situation;  4= Regional issues;  5=others 
____________________ 
 
In case the News item is a picture, please answer the following question; if not skip the 
next question and continue coding.  
 
Was any political forces portrayed in the picture?   If not please skip this question 
and answer the following  
 
1=Yes;       2=No 
 
 
Was any political forces mentioned in the news item? 
1= Yes;          2=No 
if the answer to this question is “no” Skip the rest of the coding, if yes continue the 
coding process and answer the following questions.  
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Which political forces are mentioned?  
Political forces  Mentioned 
Parties   
1= El-Horeya Wel- Adala Party  
2= AL- Nour Party   
3= Al-Wasat Party  
4= Al-Masreyeen Al Ahrar Party  
5= Al-Wafd party  
6= Al-Tagamouee party  
7= Strong Egypt party   
8= AL Tahalouf el Shaaby party   
9= The Egyptian Democratic party  
10=others (                    )  
Political Movements and pressure 
groups 
 
11= Gabhet El Inaqz  
12= Muslim brothers group  
13= Tamaroud movement   
14= Gabhet el Dameer Movement   
15= 6th of April movement   
16= Salafitsdawaa movement  
17= El Gamaa El Islamiya  
18= Abu Ismaiel supporters   
19= The liberal forces in general  
20= The Islamists forces in general  
21= Others   
Political figures   
22= The Egyptian president Mohamed 
Morsi  
 
23= The General MB guide Mohamed 
Badee 
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24= Mohamed El Baradee  
25= Hamdeen Sabahi  
26= Abdel Fatah El Sisi  
27= Amr Moussa  
28= Refaat el Saied  
29= Mohamed Abou El Ghar  
30= Khairat el Shater  
31= Saad el Katatny  
32= Ayman nour  
33= KHALED ALI  
34= Hesham Kandil  
35= Ahmed Shafik  
36= Other 
(                                         ) 
 
 
 
What are the frames used for each of the mentioned political forces  
 
What are the frames used for each of the mentioned political forces?  
 
The Political Parties  
 Primary Frame Secondary 
frame  
Frame 3 Frame 4  Frame 5  
1= El-
Horeya 
Wel-Adala 
Party 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality  
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= AL- 
Nour Party  
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
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4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
3= Al-
Wasat 
Party 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Al-
Masreyeen 
Al Ahrar 
Party 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
5= Al-Wafd 
party 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
6= Al-
Tagamouee 
party 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
7= Strong 
Egypt party  
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
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4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
8= AL 
Tahalouf el 
Shaaby 
party  
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
9= The 
Egyptian 
Democratic 
party 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
10=others (                    
) 
 
 
1=
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
Political Movements and pressure groups 
11= Gabhet 
El Inaqz 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
12= Muslim 
brothers 
group 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
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4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
13= 
Tamaroud 
movement  
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
14= Gabhet 
el Dameer 
Movement  
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
15= 6th of 
April 
movement  
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
16= 
Salafitsdaw
aa 
movement 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
17= El 
Gamaa El 
Islamiya 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
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4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
18= Abu 
Ismaiel 
supporters  
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
19= The 
liberal 
forces in 
general 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
20= The 
Islamists 
forces in 
general 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
21= Others       
Political figures  
22= The 
Egyptian 
president 
Mohamed 
Morsi  
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
23= The 
General 
MB guide 
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
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Mohamed 
Badee 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
24= 
Mohamed 
El Baradee 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
25= 
HamdeenSa
bahi 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
26= Abdel 
Fatah El 
Sisi 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
27= Amr 
Moussa 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
28= Refaat 
el Saied 
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
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2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
29= 
Mohamed 
Abou El 
Ghar 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
30= Khairat 
el Shater 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
31= Saad el 
Katatny 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
32= Ayman 
nour 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
33= 
KhaledAly 
 
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
1= 
Responsibility  
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2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
34= 
Hesahm 
Kandil 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
35= Ahmed 
Shafik 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
1= 
Responsibility  
2= Human 
Interest 
3= Conflict 
4= Economics 
consequences  
5= Morality 
36= Others       
 
Was any of the political forces mentioned as a source of news and information and 
analysis concerning framing other political forces 
 
1= Yes;             2=No 
If No, please escape the next question and end the coding process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which political forces were used as as source of news, information, and analysis 
related to framing other political forces. 
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Political forces  Mentioned 
Parties   
1= El-Horeya Wel Adala Party  
2= AL- Nour Party   
3= Al-Wasat Party  
4= Al-Masreyeen Al Ahrar Party  
5= Al-Wafd party  
6= Al-Tagamouee party  
7= Strong Egypt party   
8= AL Tahalouf el Shaaby party   
9= The Egyptian Democratic party  
10=others (                    )  
Political Movements and pressure groups  
11= Gabhet El Inaqz  
12= Muslim brothers group  
13= Tamaroud movement   
14= Gabhet el Dameer Movement   
15= 6th of April movement   
16= Salafitsdawaa movement  
17= El Gamaa El Islamiya  
18= Abu Ismaiel supporters   
19= The liberal forces in general  
20= The Islamists forces in general  
21= Others   
Political figures   
22= The Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi   
23= The General MB guide Mohamed Badee  
24= Mohamed El Baradee  
25= HamdeenSabahi  
26= Abdel Fatah El Sisi  
27= Amr Moussa  
28= Refaat el Saied  
29= Mohamed Abou El Ghar  
30= Khairat el Shater  
31= Saad el Katatny  
32= Ayman nour  
33= KhaledAly  
34= Hesham Kandil   
35= Ahmed Shafik  
36= Others  
 
 
 
 
